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NO MORE SPLITTING:  USING A FACTUAL 
INQUIRY TO DETERMINE SIMILAR MOTIVE 
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 
804(b)(1) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After dropping out of high school, John Olinger opened a small 
home remodeling company in Northern Indiana.1  John‘s company is not 
extremely lucrative; however, John‘s wife works as a secretary and their 
salaries combined amount to just enough to provide for their three 
teenage children and to pay their monthly mortgage. 
John and his wife recently purchased a small two-bedroom home 
near Roosevelt High School so that their children would not have to 
attend Jackson High School.  John and his wife did not want their 
children to attend Jackson because the school is infamous for having 
academic deficiencies, gang problems, and high drop-out rates.  John 
insisted that his children attend Roosevelt because, as a high school 
drop-out, John did not want his children to follow in his path. 
John and his family had a good life; however, on June 16, 2008, 
John‘s life took a turn for the worst.  A grand jury indicted John and two 
others in the Northern District of Indiana for conspiracy to commit 
fraud, embezzlement, and extortion.  If the jury convicts John, he faces 
ten to twenty years in prison, and he will miss out on being with his 
children during their critical years of development.  Moreover, if John‘s 
family loses his income, his wife will not be able to make the mortgage 
payment and the family will likely move in with his sister, forcing his 
children to attend Jackson High School and live in a crowded house.  
Needless to say, if convicted, life for John, his wife, and his three 
children will take a dramatic shift. 
Before John‘s trial began, the other two defendants accepted plea 
bargains with the government and agreed to cooperate with the 
government if necessary.  During the trial, John called both of the 
defendants to testify, but each asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to 
testify.  Subsequently, the prosecution called a witness who gave 
testimony incriminating John and portraying him as the mastermind 
behind the whole conspiracy.  The witness‘s testimony contradicted the 
other two defendants‘ grand jury testimony, which admitted that John 
did not actively participate in the conspiracy, and that they were the 
brains behind the operation.  John attempted to admit the grand jury 
testimony under Rule 804(b)(1); however, the district court held that the 
                                                 
1 This fact pattern is a hypothetical created by the author. 
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exculpatory grand jury testimony did not satisfy the similar motive 
requirement of Rule 804(b)(1).  Therefore, the district court did not allow 
John to use the testimony to persuade the jury of his innocence. 
John and his attorney promptly appealed the district court‘s decision 
not to admit the exculpatory grand jury testimony.  John argues that the 
prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding and at trial did 
not differ because the prosecutor always had the same goal—to extract 
testimony incriminating John.  On the other hand, the prosecutor argues 
that there was no similar motive during the grand jury proceeding 
because of the lower burden of proof and the ability to call only 
witnesses the prosecutor wants to examine.  Furthermore, the prosecutor 
argues that there is no incentive to question a witness heavily during a 
grand jury proceeding because the prosecutor might not want to give up 
important information about an ongoing investigation, and if the 
prosecutor finds out the witness is lying, he can bring a perjury charge 
later.  Both sides made all of these arguments in briefs before the Seventh 
Circuit and are awaiting the court‘s decision on how to interpret the 
similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1). 
Appellate courts are currently split on how to determine whether 
exculpatory grand jury testimony satisfies the similar motive 
requirement of Rule 804(b)(1).  One of the approaches consistently finds 
that the government does not have a similar motive during a grand jury 
proceeding as it does at trial, while the other approach consistently finds 
that the government‘s motive during a grand jury proceeding is similar 
to its motive at trial.  This Note proposes a set of factors for courts to 
examine when deciding whether to admit exculpatory grand jury 
testimony.  First, Part II of this Note provides an introduction to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the background and purpose of the 
hearsay rule, followed by the former testimony exception of the hearsay 
rule and the two different approaches circuit courts take when deciding 
whether to admit exculpatory grand jury testimony.2  Second, Part III 
discusses the positive and negative aspects of the different 
interpretations of similar motive.3  Finally, Part IV proposes factors for 
courts to use as guidance to decide whether to admit exculpatory grand 
jury testimony.4 
                                                 
2 See infra Part II (giving a background to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the hearsay 
rule, former testimony exception, and the two different approaches courts take to 
determine whether to admit exculpatory grand jury testimony). 
3 See infra Part III (describing the positive and negative consequences of the two 
different approaches courts use to interpret similar motive). 
4 See infra Part IV (suggesting how the courts should decide whether to admit 
exculpatory grand jury testimony). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
America‘s judicial system ensures due process and guarantees the 
right to a fair trial for everyone.5  The laws are meant to apply equally to 
all, and ideally all courts should interpret laws the same way.6  Part of 
receiving a fair trial includes the right to examine witnesses and present 
evidence, which is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence in federal 
court.7  The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to promote 
fairness and to provide consistency in determining what evidence is 
admissible during trial.8  However, courts interpreting Rule 804(b)(1) are 
anything but consistent, and how the rule applies depends on which 
court is interpreting the rule.9  First, Part II.A and Part II.B offer an 
                                                 
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring that the accused has an opportunity to confront 
and examine witnesses).  The Sixth Amendment also guarantees the right to counsel and 
notice of the crime being charged.  Id.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee 
that the accused receives due process before being convicted of a crime.  U.S. CONST. 
amends. V, XIV.  See generally Neb. Press Ass‘n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 616 (1976) (stating 
that the accused is innocent until proven guilty). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  See generally Introduction, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Desktop 
Default.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (attempting to create 
uniformity in laws amongst the states by creating Uniform and Model Acts).  Uniformity in 
the law makes the legal life of businesses and people simpler because people know how the 
law will apply and what to expect.  Id. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See also FED. R. EVID. 101 (stating that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence apply to proceedings in all courts of the United States, bankruptcy judges, and 
United States magistrate judges). 
8 FED. R. EVID. 102.  Judges must use the Federal Rules of Evidence to ensure fairness, 
prevent waste and delay, and promote the growth of the law so justice is served.  Id. 
9 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).  Rule 804(b)(1), commonly called the former testimony 
exception, makes normally inadmissible hearsay admissible.  Id.  Rules 804(b)(1) reads: 
 (b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 (1) Former testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another 
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken 
in compliance with law in the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, 
in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination. 
Id.  Compare United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the 
defendant‘s argument that his state grand jury testimony should not be admitted because 
the prosecutor‘s motive to cross-examine him was not the same during trial), with United 
States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the government possessed 
the same motive during the grand jury as it did during trial because during each 
proceeding the government attempted to get testimony incriminating the defendant).  See, 
e.g., 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 304 (6th ed. 2006) (stating that 
the circuit courts appear to be in disagreement over whether grand jury exculpatory 
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introduction to the Federal Rules of Evidence and provide the purpose 
and background of the hearsay rule.10  Second, Part II.B.1 introduces 
Rule 804(b)(1), the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, and 
explains the rule.11  Finally, Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b explore the two 
different approaches circuit courts take when a defendant attempts to 
admit exculpatory grand jury testimony under the former testimony 
exception.12 
A. Introduction to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Every day in trials across the country, witnesses take the stand and 
testify about their knowledge or recollection of facts relevant to a 
disputed legal issue.13  The ability to call witnesses during a lawsuit is 
one of the most crucial aspects of a fair trial.14  Lawsuits are largely 
dependent upon facts, and many times the only way to prove a fact is 
with witness testimony.15  However, witnesses testifying during a trial 
cannot tell their story any way they want.16  Witnesses are often 
interrupted by lawyers arguing about legal admissibility issues, and then 
the judge may rule on the dispute and restrict the matters the witness 
may address in his testimony.17 
                                                                                                             
testimony meets Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
10 See infra Part II.A. and Part II.B (discussing the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
providing a background to the hearsay rule). 
11 See infra Part II.B.1 (providing an explanation of the former testimony exception to the 
hearsay rule). 
12 See infra Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b (explaining the broad and narrow interpretations 
of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement). 
13 DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE:  A STRUCTURED APPROACH 2 (2d ed. 
2008).  The trial gives the parties a formal setting to express their differing views and 
opinions, while also resolving the conflict and attempting to achieve justice.  Id. 
14 Id.  Lawyers constantly try to reveal witness testimony and other evidence favorable 
to their side, and if the testimony or evidence is not favorable, lawyers try to use the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent the evidence from reaching the jury.  Id. 
15 See Maurice Possley, A Witness’s Role, AMERICA.GOV (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2009/July/20090706174632ebyessedo0.9546885. 
html (arguing that witness testimony is very important to deciding a case and witness 
testimony has the power to influence the emotions of a jury to persuade them how to 
decide the case). 
16 LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 1. 
17 Id.  During trials: 
People who know what happened are not allowed simply to tell the 
story in the way they see fit.  Instead, lawyers often rudely interrupt a 
witness‘s narrative to argue about arcane legal issues.  At the end of 
these arguments the judge might instruct the witness not to talk about 
certain things or to talk about them in one way but not another, all 
without ever explaining why.  The lawyers further control the telling 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 7
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The purpose of witness testimony during trials is to discover the 
truth and get to the bottom of a disputed legal issue.18  Consequently, 
witnesses are only permitted to testify about facts relevant to the 
underlying legal controversy.19  Evidence is relevant if it has any 
tendency to increase or decrease the likelihood that a fact is true.20  Just 
because evidence is relevant, however, does not necessarily mean the 
evidence is admissible.21  Introducing evidence during a trial can be a 
very difficult process, but the Federal Rules generally favor admissibility 
                                                                                                             
of the story by deciding what questions to ask.  These questions rarely 
allow the witness to explain things the way she would like and often 
fail to tell the jurors what they want to know.  After the witness 
responds to one lawyer‘s questions, the other lawyer typically attacks 
her answers and sometimes even her character. 
Id. 
18 ROBERTO ARON & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, HOW TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL 4 
(1985).  The legal profession perpetuates the notion that trials are only used to determine 
the truth.  Id.  As a result, people often believe that the witnesses one calls share facts 
favorable to that party.  Id.; see also LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 2.  Trials give 
―parties the opportunity to present opposing views and opinions, maintaining peace and 
social order by providing a formal setting in which to engage in conflict, resolving those 
conflicts, achieving ‗justice,‘ and testing the viability and scope of specific rules of law.‖  
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 2. 
19 FED. R. EVID. 401.  Rule 401 states that ―‗[r]elevant evidence‘ means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖  Id.; 
see also FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing reasons why relevant evidence may not be admissible); 
FED. R. EVID. 403 (balancing probative values against the dangers of misleading the jury, 
unfair prejudice, or waste of time, and further stating that relevant evidence may not be 
admissible). 
20 FED. R. EVID. 401; see also EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 544 (3d ed. 
1984) (proposing that relevant evidence is evidence that advances the inquiry into the legal 
dispute).  See generally Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403:  Observations on the Nature 
of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 499–510 (1983) (discussing the history 
of Rule 403 and analyzing the rule). 
21 FED. R. EVID. 403.  Relevant evidence can be excluded to avoid confusion, waste of 
time, or prejudice.  Id.; see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 33–40 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LILLY INTRODUCTION] (stating that relevant 
evidence can be inadmissible because of unfair prejudice, constitutional provisions, and 
statutory enactments).  See generally United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611, 618–19 (2d Cir. 
1976) (holding that evidence of the accused possessing a gun when arrested for a bank 
robbery was unfairly prejudicial because the jury would likely view the accused as a 
dangerous person that should be in jail). 
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of evidence.22  For the most part, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern 
whether evidence is admissible during a trial.23 
On January 2, 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence 
to govern the admissibility of evidence and to regulate how to present 
evidence to the trier of fact.24  The purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is to secure fairness, conserve judicial resources, and prevent 
unnecessary waste.25  The Federal Rules of Evidence encourage judges to 
use their discretion to promote the growth and development of evidence 
law.26  The rules only apply to proceedings before courts of the United 
States, United States bankruptcy judges, and United States magistrate 
judges.27  However, after Congress enacted the rules, over forty states 
                                                 
22 See Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (stating that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence  contain a liberal thrust towards admissibility); see also FED. R. EVID. 401–
403 (defining relevance broadly); LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing the 
theory that the more evidence is admitted, the more likely the goals of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence will be satisfied). 
23 See LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 3 (―[T]he adversary system and the rules of 
evidence are the mechanisms we use to strike the complex balance between truth and the 
competing goals of the trial process.‖).  Attorneys often employ trial tactics and strategies 
to prevent the truth from coming out during trial, and the rules of evidence often prevent 
attorney‘s from doing so.  Id.  Additionally, ―federal evidence law requires a great deal of 
interpretation, and many rules explicitly call upon the trial judge to exercise discretion.‖  Id. 
at 6. 
24 Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting the rules).  Before Congress 
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, ―all evidence rules were a product of common law.‖  
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 5.  For the most part, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
adopted the existing common law.  Id. at 6.  The common law rules of evidence contained 
more strict exclusionary rules and conventions than the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id.  The 
Federal Rules take a relaxed approach and give the trial judge a great deal of responsibility.  
Id.  There were four other attempts to codify evidence law before Congress enacted the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE:  PRACTICE UNDER 
THE RULES 4 (3d ed. 2009). 
25 FED. R. EVID. 102.  Rule 102 reads: 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of 
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
Id.; see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 1–2 (2006) [hereinafter LILLY 
EVIDENCE] (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence controls what information the jury 
hears, expedites the trial, improves the quality of evidence introduced, and maintains a fair 
balance during trials). 
26 FED. R. EVID. 102; see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (giving the judge the responsibility of 
deciding preliminary questions of fact to determine if evidence is admissible).  See generally 
DANIEL A. GRIFFITH, A VIEW FROM THEIR BENCH:  EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY BEST 
PRACTICES 8 (2008) (suggesting that judges are gatekeepers who must ensure that evidence 
presented during a trial is trustworthy). 
27 FED. R. EVID. 101; see also FED. R. EVID. 1101 (giving the extent to which the Federal 
Rules of Evidence apply and exceptions to the rules). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/7
2010] Similar Motive and Rule 804(b)(1) 163 
adopted similar evidence rules to use in state courts.28  Only a few states, 
such as Illinois, Massachusetts, and California, have not adopted a 
version of the federal rules.29 
B. Hearsay Rule―Federal Rule of Evidence 801 
In the states that have adopted a version of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, one of the most well-known, frustrating, and convoluted 
evidence rules is the hearsay rule.30  According to Rule 801, the hearsay 
rule defines as hearsay any ―statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.‖31  The general understanding is 
that hearsay occurs when a witness repeats information that he obtained 
from a second-hand source.32  Not every statement by an out-of-court 
                                                 
28 LILLY EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 2.  Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the majority of evidence law came from state and federal judicial decision.  Id.  
As more states adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence law became code-based 
and American courts experienced greater uniformity.  Id. 
29 MUELLER ET AL., supra note 24, at 4 n.2.  As of 2009, forty-two states adopted evidence 
codes modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id.  Even in the states that have not 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, appellate decisions frequently cite them while 
adopting the underlying principles behind the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. at 4. 
30 LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 135.  ―No evidence rule is as vexing to law 
students as the hearsay rule.‖  Id.; see also Roger C. Park, McCormick on Evidence and the 
Concept of Hearsay:  A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. 
REV. 423, 424 (1981) (suggesting that students may favor the simplification of the hearsay 
rules that scholars advocate for when they become lawyers).  See generally 5 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 9 (3d ed. 1940) (stating that the idea of the hearsay rule 
developed in the 1500s, but the rule did not become completely developed until the early 
1700s). 
31 FED. R. EVID. 801; see also IRVING YOUNGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 145–46 (3d 
ed. 1997) (discussing that the hearsay rule is extremely complex and scholars differ on how 
to define hearsay and even more so on how the hearsay rule should apply); Olin Guy 
Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 50–
91 (1982) (breaking down the hearsay rule and explaining the rule in-depth); Carl C. 
Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210, 210–11 (1961) (stating that there generally 
is not one accepted definition of hearsay and giving several evidence law scholars‘ 
definition of hearsay). 
32 LILLY INTRODUCTION, supra note 21, at 180.  For an in-depth analysis on the reasoning 
and theory of the hearsay rule, see generally Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal 
Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43, 73–100 (1994); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial 
Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 727–50 (1992); Roger C. 
Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 54–88 (1987); Eleanor 
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1341–90 (1987); Glen 
Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1525, 1527–42 (1996). 
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declarant is hearsay.33  The proponent of the statement must also offer 
the statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted.34 
The purpose behind the hearsay rule is to ensure the accuracy of 
statements made out-of-court and to allow cross-examination of 
witnesses.35  The Anglo-American tradition had three conditions that 
had to be met for witnesses to testify:  (1) presence at trial, (2) cross-
examination, and (3) an oath or affirmation.36  The hearsay rule ensures 
compliance with these three conditions, and if one is missing, the 
statement is likely inadmissible because of its inherent unreliability.37  
                                                 
33 FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW:  A STUDENT‘S GUIDE 
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 241 (1998) (illustrating that an 
out-of-court statement is not hearsay when the trier of fact does not need to rely on the 
credibility of the declarant.)  For example, if the out-of-court statement ―Help me!‖ is 
offered to prove the declarant was alive when he uttered the statement, the jury does not 
have to rely on the declarant‘s credibility because the statement is useful simply by the fact 
the declarant made the statement, not by the content or truthfulness of the statement.  PARK 
ET AL., supra note 33, at 241–42. 
34 FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 925–26 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (finding that school documents were hearsay in an abuse trial to show the victim 
had behavioral problems); United States v. Sadler, 234 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding 
that the defendant‘s protest of innocence was hearsay if the defendant offered it to prove 
he ―was in fact innocent‖). 
35 Wheaton, supra note 31, at 219–22.  The reasons for the adoption of the hearsay rule 
include lack of opportunity to cross-examine, inability to observe demeanor evidence, and 
the lack of trust in the jury.  JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN‘S 
EVIDENCE MANUAL STUDENT EDITION §§ 17.02[2]–.03[3] (6th ed. 2003).  Without cross-
examination, the trier of fact cannot observe testimonial infirmities and determine the 
credibility of a speaker.  MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE:  A 
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 81 (1989).  Hearsay is inadmissible because the 
declarant‘s statement is not subject to cross-examination, and the jury cannot assess the 
declarant‘s demeanor and credibility.  See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 292–
94 (1973); State v. McVay, 622 P.2d 9, 12 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Freber, 366 So. 2d 426, 427–28 
(Fla. 1978); Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 126, 129–30 (Wyo. 1985); see also State v. Murray, 174 
P.3d 407, 428 (Kan. 2008) (stating that when statements are offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in the statement, the credibility of the declarant provides the basis for the 
inference).  Thus, the declarant has to be available for cross-examination.  Murray, 174 P.3d 
at 428. 
36 GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:  RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 400–01 (1999).  At common law, the system excluded most 
evidence that failed to satisfy these three conditions.  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 
(1970); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee‘s notes (suggesting that all 
hearsay lacks presence at trial and the court cannot evaluate the declarant‘s demeanor).  See 
generally Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (―The primary justification for 
the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine 
the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence.‖). 
37 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 401; see also Michael H. Graham, “Stickperson 
Hearsay”:  A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 887, 888 (―When the statement is hearsay, the trier of fact is not in a position to assess 
the proper weight to be accorded the out-of-court statement . . . .‖); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., 
Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:  A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of 
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The hearsay rule preserves the ability to evaluate a witness‘s perception, 
memory, narration, and sincerity.38  When hearsay evidence is offered, 
the hearsay witness does not have any knowledge of the event the out-
of-court declarant‘s statement concerns; therefore, the court can only 
explore the hearsay witness‘s demeanor and memory to determine 
whether the witness correctly heard the out-of-court declarant‘s 
statement.39  Thus, when the court does not have any way to examine the 
reliability of the statement, the court considers the statement as 
hearsay.40 
On the other hand, the hearsay rule is extremely broad and it can 
make valuable evidence inadmissible.41  As a consequence of this 
predicament, Congress created numerous exceptions to the rule in order 
to make hearsay admissible under situations that supply guarantees of 
trustworthiness.42  Many criticize this approach, arguing the rule is too 
complex, prevents the growth of evidence law, and does not differentiate 
                                                                                                             
Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22 (stating that cross-examination allows the court to test the 
accuracy of the witness‘s memory, perception, and communication).  
38 PAUL R. RICE, BEST-KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW:  101 PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND 
PITFALLS 47 (2001).  See generally 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE:  CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 209–10 (7th ed. 2000) (discussing the benefits of preserving the ability to evaluate 
a declarant‘s perception, narration, sincerity, and memory); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative 
Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 331–46 (1961) (discussing the hearsay rule and the 
uses of the rule). 
39 PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES:  150 THINGS YOU WERE NEVER 
TAUGHT, FORGOT, OR NEVER UNDERSTOOD 55 (2006).  Hearsay testimony involves two 
truths:  the fact that certain words were spoken and the substance of what the spoken 
words describe.  Id.  In addition, the original declarant‘s untested memory, sincerity, 
ambiguity, and perception give rise to the hearsay rule.  Id.  See generally Christopher B. 
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform:  The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 
391 (1992) (arguing that cross-examining a witness cannot make statements reliable, but 
rather cross-examination provides the opponent with an opportunity to test and challenge 
their stories so the trier of fact can evaluate them). 
40 PAUL R. RICE & ROY A KATRIEL, EVIDENCE:  COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 283 (2005); see also Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 21–22 (1976) (reversing a 
conviction for possession of heroin because the court considered the informant‘s statement 
that the defendant owned the apartment as hearsay, and the police did not have any other 
evidence that the defendant owned the apartment). 
41 See LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 180 (arguing the hearsay rule makes some 
evidence inadmissible that is reliable and is useful for resolving disputes); WEISSENBERGER, 
supra note 36, at 401 (stating that the hearsay rule excludes a lot of relevant evidence 
because the evidence is inherently untrustworthy). 
42 LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 5.  The hearsay rule is too broad, and the rule 
makes some evidence inadmissible that is quite reliable.  Id. at 180.  A lot of hearsay is too 
useful and important to do without.  Id.  As a result, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain 
roughly thirty exceptions and eight exemptions to the hearsay rule.  Id.  Almost all of the 
states have adopted the hearsay exemptions and exceptions.  Id. 
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between good and bad hearsay.43  The only alternatives to the hearsay 
rule are to abolish the rule altogether and admit all hearsay, admit the 
hearsay with procedural safeguards if the hearsay has great probative 
value, or adjust the current exceptions.44  In any event, the hearsay rule 
will never be flawless, and the courts must use the hearsay rule and all of 
the exceptions to the best of their ability to ensure fairness and to 
promote the growth of evidence law.45 
1. Former Testimony Exception―Rule 804(b)(1) 
One of the numerous exceptions that courts must use to ensure 
fairness and promote the growth of evidence law is the former testimony 
exception.46  In order for the former testimony exception to apply, the 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Park, supra note 32, at 122 (discussing the hearsay rule and arguing that the 
currently existing structures against hearsay in criminal cases should not change).  In civil 
cases, however, the hearsay rule should be liberalized to permit the court to consider 
additional evidence.  Id.  See generally Perry Wadsworth, Jr., Constitutional Admissibility of 
Hearsay under the Confrontation Clause:  Reliability Requirement for Hearsay Admitted under a 
Non-“Firmly Rooted” Exception—Idaho v. Wright, 14 CAMPBELL L. REV. 347, 359 (1992) 
(arguing that in many cases, what a hearsay declarant says on cross-examination will not 
likely have a persuasive impact on the jury). 
44 FED. R. EVID. ART. VIII advisory committee‘s note; ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND 
CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 163–93 (1996); see also Park, supra note 32, at 122 
(analyzing and discussing possible changes to the hearsay rule and concluding that further 
liberalization of the hearsay rule in civil cases is appropriate). 
45 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (stating that Rule 102 suggests judges should 
interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence to promote fairness, eliminate unjustifiable delay 
and expense, and to promote the growth of evidence law to determine the truth so 
proceedings can be justly determined). 
46 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).  The difference between a hearsay exception and exemption is 
that a hearsay exception is hearsay, but each exception to the hearsay rule has a feature that 
reduces the danger of admitting the hearsay.  LILLY EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 193–268.  
On the other hand, statements that fit under a hearsay exemption are not hearsay according 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. at 166–92; see supra note 9 (providing the text of Rule 
804(b)(1)); see also, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 (containing twenty-four exceptions to the hearsay 
rule that apply regardless of whether the declarant is available).  Rule 804 contains a total 
of six exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply when a declarant is unavailable.  FED. R. 
EVID. 804.  Furthermore, Rule 807, the residual exception, applies to hearsay not covered 
under Rule 803 or 804 that has guarantees of trustworthiness when the court determines 
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement 
into evidence. 
FED. R. EVID. 807.  See generally LILLY EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 248–56 (providing a 
discussion of the former testimony exception and illustrations of how the former testimony 
exception applies).  The ability to admit hearsay testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) is similar 
to Rule 32(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows an adverse party to 
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declarant must be unavailable.47  Under Rule 804(b)(1), prior testimony is 
admissible so long as the ―party against whom the testimony is now 
offered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.‖48  Offering 
                                                                                                             
use a deposition taken by the party‘s officer, managing agent, or director for any purpose.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3). 
47 FED. R. EVID. 804.  Rule 804(a) reads: 
 (a) Definition of unavailability.  ―Unavailability as a witness‖ 
includes situations in which the declarant-- 
 (1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege 
from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant‘s 
statement; or  
 (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of 
the declarant‘s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or  
 (3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the 
declarant‘s statement; or  
 (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of 
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or  
 (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement 
has been unable to  
procure the declarant‘s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay 
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant‘s 
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.   
 A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, 
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the 
procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the 
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 
Id.  For a discussion of unavailability, see 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence §§ 695–703 (2008); 
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 556–64.  See generally Jack R. Jelsema et al., Hearsay Under 
the Proposed Federal Rules:  A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1101–05 (1969) 
(discussing the different situations that meet the unavailability requirement).  Rule 
804(b)(1) is not meant to bind a party to a position taken previously, such as collateral 
estoppel or res judicata.  Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804:  Admissible 
Hearsay from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1987).  Courts use Rule 
804(b)(1) to preserve testimony from a person no longer available.  Id. 
48 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).  The determination of whether former testimony is admissible 
is determined by the judge under Rule 104(a).  FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  Rule 104(a) reads: 
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally.  Preliminary questions 
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence 
of privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the 
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).  In making its 
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those 
with respect to privileges. 
Id.  The similar motive requirement makes a comparison between an examiner‘s motive at 
the prior proceeding to what his motive would be at the current proceeding.  United States 
v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992).  The Federal Rules of Evidence are 
interpreted using a plain meaning approach.  See, e.g., Edward R. Becker & Aviva 
Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” 
Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for 
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 864–68 (1992) (addressing how 
courts use the plain meaning to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence); Edward Cleary, 
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testimony from a previous proceeding presents a hearsay problem 
because the declarant of the statement is not present at trial.49  Therefore, 
the jury cannot observe the witness‘s demeanor, and the statement is 
hearsay.50 
2. Opportunity and Similar Motive 
Even though the jury cannot observe the witness‘s demeanor, the 
former testimony exception is justified by policies of trustworthiness and 
necessity.51  Former testimony is trustworthy because at the previous 
proceeding, the declarant appeared under oath for examination and 
cross-examination.52  It is highly likely that a witness‘s prior testimony is 
                                                                                                             
Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 911–19 (1978) 
(discussing the plain meaning rule and how the rule relates to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence).  See generally Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1917) (applying 
the plain meaning rule and ignoring the purpose of a statute).  Similar motive is not 
defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, so the plain meaning applies, unless the plain 
meaning leads to an unconstitutional result.  Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 
504, 510 (1989).  The dictionary defines ―similar‖ as ―having characteristics in common,‖ 
―comparable,‖ and ―very much alike.‖  WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
2120 (2002).  However, ―similar‖ does not mean identical.  Murray v. Toyota Motor Distrib. 
Inc., 664 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1982).  Moreover, ―motive‖ is defined as ―something 
within a person that incites him to action.‖  WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1475 (2002) (parenthetical omitted). 
49 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee‘s note.  The witness previously appeared 
under oath and was subjected to cross-examination; therefore, under the former testimony 
exception, the only ideal condition missing is demeanor evidence from the declarant 
appearing at trial.  Id.  Former testimony is arguably the most reliable hearsay.  Id. 
50 RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 40, at 391.  Former testimony is considered to be especially 
reliable hearsay.  Id.  The only problem with former testimony is the inability to observe the 
demeanor of the witness.  Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) 
(holding that the former testimony exception is unlike other hearsay exceptions and is 
simply a weak substitute for live testimony); 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 308 (6th ed. 2006).  See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983) 
(stating that the purpose of the jury is to decipher between true and false testimony, no 
matter how important the matter is); James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A 
Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 
(1962) (arguing that the purpose of the jury is to make credibility determinations); Toni M. 
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and 
Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 512–13 (1986) (discussing the importance juries serve and 
that juries protect citizens from abuses of power by the government). 
51 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 487 (1977).  
See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the importance of 
allowing the jury to make decisions to protect the defendant from corruption, overzealous 
prosecutors, and potentially biased judges); Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 840–41 (Fla. 
1984) (suggesting that the American society places an extreme importance on the right to be 
judged by peers). 
52 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 567; see FISHMAN, supra note 38, at 209 (arguing that 
to some people taking an oath causes them to testify honestly out of fear of being charged 
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accurate and reliable when the declarant testifies under the penalty of 
perjury.53 
Furthermore, Rule 804(b)(1) is based upon the idea that a party who 
previously had an opportunity and motive to develop testimony should 
not be able to exclude the testimony because of the decision not to cross-
examine or to cross-examine lightly.54  The opportunity and similar 
motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) ensures that the party against whom 
testimony is being offered had a meaningful opportunity to sufficiently 
examine the witness and expose possible flaws in the testimony.55  
Moreover, as long as the motivation to examine a witness is substantially 
the same, a change of courts or argument will not render the former 
testimony inadmissible.56  Rule 804(b)(1), however, does not apply when 
                                                                                                             
with perjury and that cross-examination shows potential biases, weaknesses, and 
ambiguities in the witness‘s testimony). 
53 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980) (allowing witness testimony because the 
court thought the witness participated in the functional equivalent of cross-examination); 
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (finding testimony from a previous trial 
admissible because the respondent had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, and the 
testimony formed the basis for the murder conviction). 
54 GRAHAM, supra note 35, at 277.  A tactical decision not to cross-examine a witness or to 
cross-examine lightly does not affect the adequacy of opportunity.  Id.; see also California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (holding that a witness‘s testimony is admissible when the 
testimony is given under circumstances closely resembling trial and the respondent had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness about his testimony). 
55 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).  Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement ―reflects narrow 
concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence admitted at trial.‖  United States v. Salerno 
(Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 326 (1992).  Meaningful opportunity does not necessarily mean 
the party had to take advantage of the opportunity.  Id. at 329–30.  A party that examines a 
witness lightly risks the chance that the witness will become unavailable for trial, making 
the testimony from the examination admissible.  GRAHAM, supra note 35, at 277–78; see, e.g., 
United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district 
court properly admitted former testimony when the defendant possessed a similar motive 
to develop the witness‘s testimony and any failure to cross-examine the witness resulted 
not from a lack of opportunity but from defendant‘s ineffective use of that opportunity); In 
re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that making a 
party suffer the consequences for foregoing cross-examination is fair). 
56 GRAHAM, supra note 35, at 275; see, e.g., DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 
226–27 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding opportunity and similar motive satisfied when the plaintiff‘s 
counsel asked only one question to the doctor during a worker‘s compensation case).  The 
plaintiff argued the cross-examination was limited because the only issue was whether the 
plaintiff‘s painkiller problem related to an injury on the job.  DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 226.  The 
plaintiff argued the cross-examination was not meaningful in the context of the following 
products liability case.  Id.  The Eighth Circuit did not agree and held the doctor‘s 
testimony related to the same issue in both cases—proving the allegations of misconduct 
wrong.  Id. at 226–27.; cf. United States v. Lanci, 669 F.2d 391, 394–95 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(denying the defendant‘s request to admit testimony previously given during a state 
criminal trial because the state did not have a similar motive to expose the facts 
surrounding the bribery of an FBI agent). 
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the motive of the party against whom the evidence is offered has 
substantially changed because of a cause of action change, added parties 
and issues, or an intervening indictment.57 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not define similar motive, but Rule 
804(b)(1) only requires a similar motive, not an identical one.58  The rule 
is meant to salvage the testimony of a witness for its apparent worth.59  
The opportunity and similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) can be 
problematic when tactical considerations are taken into account during 
prior testimony.60  The party examining a witness may not want to show 
                                                 
57 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 35, at § 17.02[2]; see also, e.g., United States v. Jackson-
Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 381–82 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding testimony at state agency hearing 
inadmissible during a criminal prosecution because the issues and motivations were 
substantially different); United States v. McDonald, 837 F.2d 1287, 1292–93 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding former testimony inadmissible when the defendant attempted to introduce a 
deposition taken by an insurance company because the government knew that the 
deponent would refuse to testify during trial; therefore, the testimony likely contained 
inaccuracies). 
58 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee‘s note.  To determine whether a similar motive 
exists, courts should first look at the examination that occurred during the prior proceeding 
and determine whether the party would conduct a similar examination now if given the 
chance.  United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992).  If that is not 
conclusive, the courts should ask ―whether a reasonable examiner under the circumstances 
would have had a similar motive to examine the witness.‖  Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. 
Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 188 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that Rule 804(b)(1) requires a party to 
have a similar but not necessarily an identical motive to develop testimony); Supermarket 
of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies, 71 F.3d 119, 127 (4th Cir. 1995) (requiring a similar 
motive not a more stringent identical motive); United States v. Doyle, 621 F. Supp. 2d 337, 
344 (W.D. Va. 2009) (holding that the defendant possessed a similar motive during a bond 
hearing as he would at trial). 
59 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 573; see also FISHMAN, supra note 38, at 501–33 
(providing a thorough discussion of the former testimony exception and why the rule is 
helpful).  See generally David Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Mat Ty the Horse to the Sad 
Case of A.T.:  Defensive and Offensive Use of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 HOUS. L. 
REV. 895, 904–13 (1995) (discussing the former testimony exception and how courts apply 
the rule). 
60 See BROUN ET AL., supra note 9, § 304 (stating that the circuit courts appear to be in 
disagreement over whether exculpatory grand jury testimony meets Rule 804(b)(1)‘s 
similar motive requirement) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1259 (6th Cir. 1992) (assessing similar motive requires the court to 
look at whether the two proceedings reflect a substantial identity of issues); Zenith Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (giving factors to use to 
assess similar motive:  ―(1) the type of proceeding in which the testimony is given, (2) trial 
strategy, (3) the potential penalties or financial stakes, and (4) the number of issues and 
parties.‖) (footnotes omitted).  Critics argue that if a witness offers incriminating evidence 
against a defendant during a grand jury proceeding, the government grants him immunity 
and allows him to testify at trial.  United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 324 
(1992).  Conversely, if a witness gives testimony exonerating the defendant, the 
government does not grant him immunity and excludes the evidence as hearsay.  Id.  See 
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his plans for trial or the prosecutor may just want to show enough 
evidence to secure an indictment, which is why Judith M. Mercier 
suggested courts adopt a ―reasonable examiner‖ approach to determine 
whether a similar motive existed.61  Depending on the circumstances, 
lawyers taking testimony at a proceeding before trial may have different 
motivations and concerns that they would not have if they could 
examine the witness during trial.62  Because of the differences in 
motivation to cross-examine a witness during a grand jury proceeding 
and during trial, there is a split within the circuit courts on how to 
interpret Rule 804(b)(1).63 
                                                                                                             
generally FED. R. EVID. 806 (allowing the government to impeach the declarant of a hearsay 
statement at trial if the court admits hearsay testimony). 
61 See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 522–24 (1st Cir. 1997).  During the grand jury 
proceeding, the government does not seek to discredit the witness.  Id. at 523.  The 
government may want to establish evidence for part of an ongoing investigation.  Id.  
Moreover, discrediting a grand jury witness is hardly necessary because of the lower 
burden of proof and the government‘s ability to call its own witnesses.  Id.; see also Judith 
M. Mercier, United States v. Salerno:  An Examination of Rule 804(b)(1), 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
323, 342 (1993) (suggesting that the courts should adopt a reasonable examiner approach to 
Rule 804(b)(1), in which a court evaluates whether a reasonable examiner in the situation 
would have possessed a similar motive to examine the witness). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 894 F.2d 895, 90102 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
the government did not have a similar motive during the witness‘s guilty plea hearing 
because the government‘s motive in examining is to ensure that the plea is voluntary, 
which is not the same as at a trial); cf. United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884, 896 (9th Cir. 
1981) (holding identification testimony during a previous hearing admissible after the 
identification witness died because the defendant had the same motive during the hearing 
as he would have at trial).  See generally SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, 
FEDERAL GRAND JURY:  A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 186–233 (1996) (discussing the 
history of the grand jury system and examining the importance of maintaining the secrecy 
of grand jury proceedings); MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY:  AN 
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 23–24 (1977) (arguing that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is 
important to protect those accused of a crime that may be innocent and to encourage 
witnesses to come forward and testify truthfully). 
63 See, e.g., Valerie A. DePalma, Evidence:  United States v. DiNapoli:  Admission of 
Exculpatory Grand Jury Testimony Against the Government Under Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(1), 61 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 546–77 (1995) (analyzing the United States v. DiNapoli 
decision and former testimony exception); Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc 
Determinations:  Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 591 (1996) 
(arguing that the interpretation of the evidence rules should be text centered); Randolph N. 
Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule:  The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial 
Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 441–42 
(1986) (discussing grand jury testimony as former testimony); Lizbeth A. Turner, Admission 
of Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1033, 1070 
(1985) (arguing that courts should not exclude admission of all grand jury testimony of an 
unavailable witness, and routinely admitting former testimony would undermine the 
defendant‘s ability to confront witnesses); Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony 
Hearsay Exception:  A Study in Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 
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a. Broad Interpretation of “Similar Motive” 
On one side of the split, some federal courts use a broad 
interpretation of the similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) to find that 
the government has the same motive to develop a witness‘s testimony 
during a grand jury proceeding as it does at trial.64  For example, in 
United States v. Miller, the defendants attempted to call a defense witness 
who testified before the grand jury, but the witness asserted his Fifth 
Amendment right not to testify.65  Next, the defendants attempted to 
have the testimony admitted under Rule 804(b)(1), but the trial court 
determined the government did not have a similar motive during the 
trial as it did during the grand jury proceeding.66  After the court denied 
the use of the exculpatory grand jury testimony, the jury convicted both 
of the defendants.67 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court wrongly 
excluded the evidence because the government had a similar motive to 
question the defense witness during the grand jury proceeding and at 
trial.68  The government had a similar motive because in both situations 
                                                                                                             
N.C. L. REV. 295, 335–36 (1989) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should address how to 
interpret Rule 804(b)(1)). 
64 See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443–45 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
testimony from a 1966 preliminary hearing was admissible under 804(b)(1) in a 2003 
prosecution for the same offense because the defendant‘s motive was always to discredit a 
witness providing testimony to convict him); Battle v. Mem‘l Hosp., 228 F.3d 544, 552–53 
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendants possessed a similar motive to question the 
plaintiffs‘ witness during a deposition and at trial because the defendants had the same 
interest to prove the witness‘s testimony to be inaccurate, even though the defendants 
argued that their motive during the deposition was only to understand plaintiffs‘ case).  See 
generally Glen Weissenberger, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Transcripts:  Avoiding the 
Constitutional Issue, 59 TUL. L. REV. 335, 344–49 (1984) (discussing the intended use of Rule 
804(b)(1)) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Transcripts]. 
65 904 F.2d 65, 66–68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  The court found Matazarro‘s unavailability 
undeniable so long as Matazarro could properly assert his Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. at 
68; see also United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 690 (5th Cir. 1984); In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 661 F.2d 1145, 1158 (7th Cir. 1981) (discussing 
when a witness is unavailable).  See generally R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1997) (providing the history of the Fifth Amendment‘s right 
against self-incrimination). 
66 Miller, 904 F.2d at 66–68. 
67 Id.  The jury convicted Miller and Ross for wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire 
fraud.  Id. at 65. 
68 Id. at 68; see also, e.g., United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting 
that the trial judge erroneously excluded grand jury testimony because the government 
had a prior opportunity to question the witness during the grand jury proceeding); Young 
Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d at 691 (stating that the concern for adversarial fairness in Rule 804(b)(1) 
is not in controversy when the government had the opportunity to question the witness 
during the grand jury proceeding); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516–17 (4th Cir. 
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the prosecutor focused on the same issue—whether the defendants were 
guilty or innocent.69  Thus, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Rule 804(b)(1) 
broadly by only examining whether the government focused on 
extracting incriminating testimony during the two proceedings and 
admitting the testimony.70 
Similarly, in United States v. Foster, the Drug Enforcement Agency 
conducted an investigation on suspected drug dealers.71  A witness later 
testified three times in front of a grand jury that the defendant did not 
sell drugs.72  The grand jury eventually indicted the defendant, and 
during the trial, the defendant tried to admit the witness‘s grand jury 
                                                                                                             
1979) (holding the government had a similar motive and opportunity to question witnesses 
before a grand jury as it would have during trial). 
69 Miller, 904 F.2d at 68.  The D.C. Circuit also noted that the grand jury testimony 
largely corroborated the appellants‘ testimony, and the testimony could have influenced 
the jury and resulted in an acquittal for the defendants.  Id.  Thus, the district court abused 
its discretion by excluding the testimony.  Id.; see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 
(1979) (holding that the defendant‘s right to due process required the admission of the 
statement of a co-defendant that the prosecution sought to exclude as hearsay); Chambers 
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (holding that due process requires that the accused 
in a criminal trial has the right to a fair opportunity to defend and present his case, and that 
the defendant‘s right to call witnesses to support his case is essential to due process); 
Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 411–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the district 
court violated the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by excluding 
the transcript of an unavailable witness‘s grand jury testimony). 
70 Miller, 904 F.2d at 68; see also United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 379–80 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (holding that the district courts should apply a fact-specific inquiry to examine 
whether prosecutors have a similar motive to develop testimony at a grand jury proceeding 
as they would during trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 
the government did not have similar motive to develop testimony during the trial as it did 
during the grand jury proceeding). 
71 128 F.3d 949, 951–52 (6th Cir. 1997).  The Drug Enforcement Administration (―DEA‖) 
investigated Reda Ghazaleh and Osama Shalash for dealing drugs.  Id. at 950.  The DEA 
discovered Foster did business with Ghazaleh and Shalash after observing Foster receive a 
package from Shalash.  Id.  The government eventually indicted Shalash, and he claimed he 
sold Foster cocaine six times.  Id.  Subsequently, the police executed a search warrant on 
Timothy Williams, another suspected drug dealer.  Id. at 950–51.  During the search, the 
police discovered cocaine, guns, large amounts of cash, and Foster was present carrying 
over $3000.  Id. at 951.  The police executed another search warrant at Foster‘s home.  Id.  
The search revealed documents showing Foster, whose only source of documented income 
was a small amount that he earned while working at a Marriott Hotel as a houseman, made 
several large purchases.  Id.  Foster purchased everything with cash, and Foster did not file 
an income tax return in 1993 and 1994.  Id.  In 1993, Foster purchased a 1986 Mercedes for 
$13,500, a 1989 BMW for $23,263, and a 1987 Ford for $2650.  Id.  The following year Foster 
purchased a 1985 Cadillac for $14,207, a 1987 Ford Bronco for $5000, a house lease for 
$6500, furniture for $1039, and car insurance for $1793.  Id.  Foster also had $2402 in a 
savings account.  Id. 
72 Id.  Williams testified before the grand jury three times that Foster did not sell drugs 
and that Foster would not have been at Williams‘s home if he knew Williams sold drugs.  
Id.  Williams stated that on the day the DEA searched his home, Foster just stopped by.  Id. 
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testimony under Rule 804(b)(1), but the court found the testimony 
inadmissible.73  The defendant appealed, arguing the government had 
the same motive during the grand jury proceeding as it did at trial.74  The 
Sixth Circuit held the government had a similar motive and opportunity 
to develop Williams‘ testimony before the grand jury as at trial.75  During 
both proceedings, the government‘s motive was to develop 
incriminating testimony to prove the defendant‘s guilt; therefore, the 
government had a similar motive under Rule 804(b)(1).76  Thus, in Foster, 
the Sixth Circuit adopted a broad interpretation of the similar motive 
element of Rule 804(b)(1).77 
Most recently, in United States v. McFall, McFall and three others 
were prosecuted for attempted extortion, witness tampering, conspiracy 
to commit extortion, and honest services mail fraud.78  Before the trial, 
the other three defendants accepted plea agreements and agreed to 
cooperate with the government; however, the prosecutor never called 
upon the defendants to testify at trial.79  McFall attempted to call on the 
defendants to testify during the trial, but each invoked his Fifth 
                                                 
73 Id. at 95152. 
74 Id. at 955. 
75 Id. at 955–56.  The Sixth Circuit stated that the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit 
courts all rule that the government has a similar motive to develop a witness‘s testimony at 
trial as it does during a grand jury proceeding.  Id. at 955; see United States v. Lester, 749 
F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding the government had the same motive at trial as it 
did during the grand jury proceeding); United States v. Young Bros, Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 691 
(5th Cir. 1984) (discussing that the concern for adversarial fairness in Rule 804(b)(1) is not 
present when the government already had an opportunity to examine a witness during a 
grand jury proceeding); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516–17 (4th Cir. 1979) 
(stating that when a prosecutor has an opportunity to question a witness during a grand 
jury proceeding, Rule 804(b)(1) applies, and the testimony is admissible). 
76 Foster, 128 F.3d at 956.  Foster faced a substantial sentence if convicted, and the court 
wrongly excluded the grand jury testimony from the jurors.  Id.  The grand jury testimony 
might not have led to an acquittal, but the testimony benefited Foster.  Id.  Additionally, the 
government only had circumstantial evidence, and the defendant should have been able to 
present the witness‘s testimony denying the defendant dealt drugs.  Id.; see also Kotteakos 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (―[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that 
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that 
substantial rights were not affected.‖). 
77 Foster, 128 F.3d at 95657.  But see United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 379–80 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (finding that district courts should apply a fact-specific inquiry to determine 
whether the government has a similar motive to develop the testimony during a grand jury 
proceeding as it does at trial).  The trial court made a sufficient inquiry and did not abuse 
its discretion by finding that the government‘s motive to develop testimony was not the 
same in front of the grand jury as it was during trial.  Id. 
78 558 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).  The prosecution alleged that the defendants used the 
County Supervisor to promote private economic interests.  Id. at 953–54. 
79 Id. at 954. 
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Amendment right not to testify.80  The government later called a new 
witness who gave testimony incriminating McFall.81  McFall attempted 
to use Rule 804(b)(1) to admit the other defendant‘s grand jury 
testimony, which referred to the testimony of the government‘s witness 
as ―ridiculous,‖ but the district court held the testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay.82 
McFall appealed and argued that the district court wrongly excluded 
the grand jury testimony.83  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the D.C. and 
Sixth Circuit‘s interpretation of similar motive and found that the district 
court wrongly excluded the evidence because Rule 804(b)(1) does not 
require an identical quantum of motivation.84  The government‘s 
purpose of questioning Sawyer before the grand jury was to extract 
testimony that the defendants conspired to commit extortion—the same 
motive the government possessed at trial.85  Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a broad interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1).86 
b. Narrow Interpretation of “Similar Motive” 
Alternatively, some federal courts have a narrow interpretation of 
the similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) and often find that a 
prosecutor‘s motives are not substantially similar because prosecutors do 
not have any interest in showing a witness‘s testimony to be false before 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  The government called Levy, a lobbyist, to testify, and Levy stated that ―Sawyer 
made extortionate threats on McFall‘s behalf during a telephone conversation to which 
Levy and Sawyer were the only parties.‖  Id. at 961. 
82 Id.  The court also noted that the government did not need to take advantage of all 
opportunities to examine Sawyer in front of the grand jury.  Id.  Rule 804(b)(1) only 
requires that the prosecution had the motive to do so.  Id.; see United States v. Geiger, 263 
F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Any failure to cross-examine Churchill resulted not from 
lack of opportunity but from the defense attorney‘s utilization of that opportunity.‖); see 
also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (―[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees 
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.‖); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 73 n.12 (1980) (discussing that if the defense‘s only chance to cross-examine a witness is 
at a preliminary hearing, there does not need to be an examination of effectiveness, unless 
an extraordinary case exists where the defense counsel did not provide adequate 
representation at the prior proceeding).  See generally FISHMAN, supra note 38, at 290–303 
(discussing the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
83 McFall, 558 F.3d at 960. 
84 Id. at 963.  The government‘s purpose in the grand jury proceeding and its purpose at 
trial were the same―drawing out testimony to secure a conviction against McFall for 
conspiring to commit extortion.  Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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a grand jury.87  For instance, in United States v. DiNapoli, several 
defendants were accused of running a bid-rigging scheme for concrete 
construction jobs.88  A grand jury returned an indictment against all of 
the defendants; however, the grand jury continued investigating to 
identify other construction projects affected and other participants in the 
scheme.89  Two witnesses testified before the grand jury that they did not 
know about the bid-rigging scheme.90  The prosecutor was skeptical of 
each witness‘s testimony, but the prosecutor refrained from confronting 
either with evidence because the prosecutor did not want to give away 
the identification of witnesses cooperating with the government or 
wiretapped conversations.91 
During the trial, the defendants attempted to call the two witnesses 
to testify, but both asserted their Fifth Amendment rights against self-
                                                 
87 See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 52324 (1st Cir. 1997) (adopting a narrow 
interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) to find former testimony inadmissible because the 
government does not have the same motivation to discredit and question a witness during 
a grand jury proceeding as it does during trial); United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 
91315 (2d Cir. 1993) (using a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) and stating that 
assessing similar motive goes beyond the simple determination of whether the government 
takes the same side on the same issue). 
88 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910–11.  The evidence showed the existence of a ―Club‖ consisting 
of six concrete construction companies.  Id. at 910.  From 1980 to 1985, the companies rigged 
bids on ―nearly every high-rise construction project in Manhattan involving more than $2 
million of concrete work.‖  Id.  The Genovese family and other organized crime figures 
participated in the scheme.  Id. 
89 Id.  The indictment alleged certain aspects of criminal activity.  Id. 
90 Id. at 911.  The two witnesses were Frederick DeMatteis and Pasquale Bruno.  Id.  
DeMatteis appeared before the grand jury three times.  Id.  During the first two 
appearances, the government asked DeMatteis background questions and questions about 
the construction industry.  Id.  During the third appearance, DeMatteis denied being 
instructed not to bid on projects and being aware of a two percent arrangement.  Id.  The 
prosecutor only briefly cross-examined DeMatteis because he did not want to give up vital 
information.  Id.  Additionally, Bruno denied being aware of the ―Club‖ and the two 
percent arrangement.  Id.  The prosecutor only briefly cross-examined Bruno, and the grand 
jury expressed concern to the prosecutor that Bruno did not answer questions truthfully.  
Id. 
91 Id.  The prosecutor did not want to disclose the identity of undisclosed witnesses 
cooperating with the government or wiretapped conversations that did not corroborate 
DeMatteis‘s testimony.  Id.  In his dissent in United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 
317, 329 (1992), Justice Stevens argued that when the government refuses to examine a 
grand jury witness because of an ongoing investigation, it is inaccurate to say the 
government did not have a similar motive to examine the witness.  The more accurate 
statement is that the government had a similar motive but decided not to pursue that 
motive.  Salerno III, 505 U.S. at 329.  Failing to examine a witness because of an ongoing 
investigation is a reason to forego cross-examination, but that does not undermine the fact 
that the government possessed an opportunity and similar motive.  Id. at 330. 
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incrimination.92  The district court refused to admit the testimony under 
Rule 804(b)(1) and the Second Circuit agreed.93  The Second Circuit held 
that determining whether a similar opportunity and motive exists 
requires the evaluation of three different factors.94  First, courts must 
look at ―whether the party resisting the offered testimony at a pending 
proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar 
intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a substantially similar 
issue.‖95  Second, courts must assess the prior cross-examination by 
looking at what was available but not pursued.96  Finally, courts must 
examine what is at stake and the burden of proof.97  Here, the Second 
Circuit held the prosecutor did not have a similar motive because the 
grand jury already indicted the defendants.98  Thus, the Second Circuit 
                                                 
92 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911.  The district court judge held that generally a prosecutor‘s 
motive during the investigatory stages of a case is different than the prosecutor‘s motive 
during trial; therefore, Rule 804(b)(1) was not satisfied.  Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. (―No 
person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .‖). 
93 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911, 915.  The Second Circuit originally held that the district court 
erred by excluding the grand jury testimony and ordered a new trial.  United States v. 
Salerno (Salerno I), 937 F.2d 797, 806–07 (2d Cir. 1991).  However, on remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) and 
held that the grand jury testimony did not satisfy the rule‘s requirements.  DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 
at 915. 
94 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15.  Some judges believe that evidence given before a grand 
jury is not necessarily reliable because the testimony is not subject to vigorous cross-
examination and the witness may lie because he usually appears under a grant of 
immunity.  See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1138–39 (4th Cir. 1978). 
95 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15; see also, e.g., State v. Farquharson, 731 N.W.2d 797, 803 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (using the factors listed in DiNapoli to determine whether a similar 
motive is present). 
96 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15.  To a lesser extent, the court should also look at the cross-
examination during the earlier proceeding and take into account ―what was undertaken 
and what was available but forgone.‖  Id. at 915.  These factors are relevant on the issue of 
similar motive, but the factors are not conclusive.  Id.  ―[E]xaminers will [always] be able to 
suggest lines of questioning that were not pursued at a prior proceeding.‖  Id. at 914.  The 
unused ways of challenging testimony are relevant to the ―similar motive‖ inquiry, but 
unused methods are only a single factor to consider.  Id. 
97 Id. at 914–15; see also, e.g., Michael M. Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547, 562–65 (1972) (analyzing factors, 
such as the purpose of and the burden of proof at a previous proceeding, and the possible 
effect on the motive to develop testimony). 
98 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15.  ―First, . . . there existed no putative defendant as to whom 
probable cause was in issue.‖  Id. at 915.  Second, the Second Circuit held 
the prosecutor had no interest in showing that the denial of the Club‘s 
existence was false.  The grand jury had already been persuaded, at 
least by the low standard of probable cause, to believe that the Club 
existed and that the defendants had participated in it to commit 
crimes.  It is fanciful to think that the prosecutor would have had any 
substantial interest in showing the falsity of the witnesses‘ denial of the 
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adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) because the court 
examined the prosecutor‘s motive at a fine level to determine whether 
the prosecutor had the same motive during the grand jury proceeding as 
he did during trial.99 
                                                                                                             
Club‘s existence just to persuade the grand jury to add one more 
project to the indictment. 
Id.  Finally, the grand jury told the prosecutor that they did not believe Bruno testified 
truthfully.  Id.  Therefore, the prosecutor did not have any interest in disproving the 
witnesses‘ testimony when the grand jury already thought the testimony was inaccurate.  
Id.  The Second Circuit also discussed the various motives a prosecutor may have for 
asking questions to a grand jury witness that may be lying.  Id.  ―The prosecutor might 
want to afford the witness a chance to embellish the lie, thereby strengthening the case for a 
subsequent perjury prosecution.  Or the prosecutor might want to provoke the witness into 
volunteering some critical new fact in the heat of an emphatic protestation of innocence.‖  
Id. 
99 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912–14.  In the dissent, Judge Miner, Judge Pratt, and Judge 
Altimari argued that the prosecutor had the same motive and opportunity.  Id. at 916 
(Miner, J., Pratt, J., & Altimari, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued the majority applies 
a gloss to the language of the rule that would find a similar motive 
only when the party against whom the testimony is offered had an 
interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the 
same side of a substantially similar issue.  As a practical matter, the 
gloss effectively rewrites the rule from similar motive to same motive. 
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation markss omitted).  The dissent argued the 
majority‘s application of Rule 804(b)(1) was stricter than the rule requires.  Id.  In addition, 
the dissent stated the following: 
[The majority‘s approach] could also prove to be extremely difficult to 
administer, for on its face [the] test would require the district judge to 
compare the intensity of interest that the prosecutor possessed before 
the grand jury with his intensity of interest at trial.  Careful 
examination of those two states of the prosecutor‘s mind would 
require a district judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing not only into 
what information was available to the prosecutor at the two different 
times, but also into what he was thinking about that information at 
both of those times. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The dissent also criticized the majority for accepting 
the prosecutor‘s argument that he already secured an indictment against the defendants 
and that the prosecutor did not think any more witnesses were going to be added when the 
witnesses were examined; therefore, probable cause was not an issue when DeMatteis and 
Bruno testified.  Id.  The dissent argued that 
[i]f all these things were true, then why was the prosecutor using the 
grand jury at all?  Could it have been simply a discovery device to 
develop more evidence to present at trial on the indictment he already 
had?  If that were the case, however, the prosecutor‘s continuing use of 
the grand jury would have been improper. 
Id.; see also United States. v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (discussing that 
prosecutors cannot use grand juries to go on ―arbitrary fishing expeditions,‖ and grand 
juries should not be used with an intent to harass); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 
Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding prosecutors 
cannot use grand juries to prepare a pending indictment for trial).  The dissent concluded 
by stating that the majority leaves the decision of whether Rule 804(b)(1) applies in the 
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Moreover, in United States v. Omar, a federal grand jury indicted two 
defendants for money laundering, bank larceny, and conspiracy.100  A 
witness testified in front of the grand jury, denying both taking any 
money from the defendant and helping the defendant put cash into 
different bank accounts.101  The witness died before trial, and when the 
defense sought to admit the witness‘s prior testimony under Rule 
804(b)(1), the district court held that the evidence was inadmissible.102 
On appeal, the First Circuit held that the government did not have a 
similar motive and opportunity during trial as it did during the grand 
jury proceeding.103  The First Circuit held that the government likely 
wanted to protect key witnesses or go after the witness later to convict 
him of perjury.104  The court noted that it is rarely essential to discredit a 
                                                                                                             
control of the prosecutor, which is ―at odds with the main objective of going to 
trial―permitting the jury, not the prosecutor, to determine what is the truth.‖  DiNapoli, 8 
F.3d at 917. 
100 United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 520 (1st Cir. 1997).  Investigators believed that 
Ferrara and Omar robbed a Brinks armored truck of roughly $900,000.  Id. 
101 Id. at 521.  During the grand jury proceeding, a friend of the defendants also testified 
that one of the defendants brought a trash bag full of money to her house on the night of 
the robbery.  Id.  The witness also stated the defendant bragged about using a gun during 
the robbery and that he buried some of the money.  Id.  The defense attorney cross-
examined the witness and brought up the fact that the witness denied having any 
knowledge about the robbery during previous grand jury testimony.  Id. 
102 Id.  Omar received a sentence of four years in prison, three years supervised release, 
and was forced to pay restitution of $908,750.  Id. 
103 Id. at 523–24.  In United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1990), the First 
Circuit held Rule 804(b)(1) did not apply to testimony from grand juries.  Omar, 104 F.3d at 
523.  However, the First Circuit decision is expressly overruled by the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in United States v. Salerno (Salerno I), 505 U.S. 317 (1992).  In Salerno I, the Supreme 
Court held Rule 804(b)(1) applied to grand jury proceedings.  505 U.S. at 327.  The Second 
Circuit adopted the same position on remand in United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914 
(2d Cir. 1993).  Furthermore, the First Circuit stated there is confusion within the circuits as 
to whether 804(b)(1) applies to grand juries.  Omar, 104 F.3d at 523.  Defendants may have a 
hard time satisfying the similar opportunity and motive test because some courts doubt 
whether Rule 804(b)(1) should apply to testimony from grand juries.  Id.; see also, e.g., 
United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that grand jury 
testimony cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 804(b)(1)); United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 
1453, 1462 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that grand jury testimony does not fit within any of the 
hearsay exceptions in Rule 804). 
104 Omar, 104 F.3d at 524.  The First Circuit discussed that an argument to admit the 
grand jury witness‘s testimony because of fairness could be made.  Id.  The First Circuit 
noted that the testimony was important to the defendants‘ case.  Id.  The grand jury 
witness‘s testimony was self-serving and suspect, but the government could have easily 
undermined the testimony at trial through another witness‘s testimony.  Id.  Moreover, if 
every ruling based on 804(b)(1) is ad hoc, predicting the outcome is nearly impossible and 
courts have a hard time implementing policy.  Id.  ―And rules themselves are debatable:  
one respected evidence code proposed that ‗hearsay . . . is admissible if . . . the 
declarant . . . is unavailable.‘‖  Id. (quoting ALI, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 503 
(1942)).  However, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain ―a broad catch-all exception for 
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grand jury witness because of the lower burden of proof during the 
grand jury proceeding, and the government can call numerous witnesses 
and select its own witnesses.105  Thus, the First Circuit used a narrow 
interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1).106 
Rule 102 states that the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
to secure fairness, conserve judicial resources, and prevent unnecessary 
waste.107  The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a framework for 
consistent application of what evidence is admissible in court.108  The 
two different interpretations of Rule 804(b)(1) are particularly troubling 
in criminal cases because a defendant‘s ability to present exculpatory 
grand jury evidence can depend on how the court interprets similar 
motive.109 
III.  ANALYSIS OF ―SIMILAR MOTIVE‖ AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS 
Interpreting similar motive is not easy for courts because the 
Supreme Court has never given courts guidance on how to determine 
whether there is a similar motive, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do 
not define ―similar motive.‖110  Rule 804(b)(1) simply states that former 
testimony is admissible when the party against whom the testimony is 
offered had a prior opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by cross, direct, or redirect examination.111  Thus, the appellate 
courts are left to choose the standards to use to determine what 
constitutes similar motive.112  First, Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2 explore 
                                                                                                             
hearsay supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.‖  Omar, 104 F.3d at 524 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
105 United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997).  Rule 804(b)(1) and the 
advisory committee‘s notes do not make clear how equivalent the opportunities to examine 
a witness need to be.  Id. at 523 n.2.  ―There are obviously issues of degree and may be other 
variables (like fault) that bear upon the answer, which is probably best left to case-by-case 
development.‖  Id. 
106 Id. at 524. 
107 See supra note 25 (providing the text for Rule 102). 
108 See supra note 25 (providing the text for Rule 102). 
109 See supra Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b (addressing the two different approaches the 
appellate courts take to determine whether former testimony is admissible). 
110 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) and what 
courts look at to determine whether a similar motive is present); see also Weissenberger, 
supra note 63, at 335–36 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should provide guidance on 
how to interpret Rule 804(b)(1)). 
111 See supra Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 (discussing Rule 804(b)(1) and how courts apply 
the rule). 
112  See supra Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b (discussing the two different approaches the 
appellate courts take to determine whether former testimony is admissible). 
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the effects of a broad interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive.113  
Second, Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 address the effects of a narrow 
interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive.114  Finally, Part III.C.1 
and Part III.C.2 address the effects of adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ 
standard to Rule 804(b)(1).115 
A. Broad Interpretation of “Similar Motive” 
A broad interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) finds that the government 
has a similar motive to develop a witness‘s testimony during grand jury 
proceedings as it does at trial because the prosecutor attempts to extract 
testimony to indict the defendant and prove that the defendant is guilty 
during both proceedings.116  Therefore, former testimony from the grand 
jury proceeding is admissible.117  A broad interpretation does not 
examine the government‘s motives in-depth but instead focuses on 
whether the prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding and 
at trial is to extract testimony to determine whether the defendant is 
guilty.118  There are several benefits to using a broad interpretation of 
Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement.119 
                                                 
113 See infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2 (analyzing the positive and negative effects of a 
broad interpretation of similar motive). 
114 See infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 (analyzing the positive and negative effects of a 
narrow interpretation of similar motive). 
115 See infra Part III.C.1 and Part III.C.2 (analyzing the positive and negative effects of 
adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard to Rule 804(b)(1)). 
116 See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the broad interpretation of similar motive and how 
courts use it). 
117 See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the broad interpretation of similar motive and 
suggesting that the government has a similar motive during a grand jury proceeding and at 
trial so long as the government attempted to develop testimony incriminating the 
defendant). 
118 Compare United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
government had a similar motive during the grand jury proceeding as it did at trial 
because during both proceedings the government attempted to develop testimony 
incriminating the defendant), with United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 91415 (2d Cir. 
1993) (using a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) and stating that assessing similar 
motive goes beyond the simple determination of whether the government takes the same 
side on the same issue).  In order for there to be a similar motive, the government must 
―have a substantially similar degree of interest in prevailing‖ on the related issues at both 
proceedings.  DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912. 
119 See infra Part III.A.1 (providing the positive aspects of a broad interpretation of similar 
motive). 
Horvath: No More Splitting:  Using a Factual Inquiry to Determine Similar
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
182 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
1. Positive Aspects of a Broad Interpretation 
The biggest benefit to using a broad interpretation is that it is easy to 
assess and produces consistent outcomes.120  The broad interpretation 
does not require courts to assess different factors, such as a prosecutor‘s 
trial strategy and tactics, different burdens of proof between 
proceedings, the government‘s ability to call its own witnesses, and 
whether an investigation is ongoing.121  Courts and defendants know 
what to expect with a broad interpretation of similar motive because 
former testimony from a grand jury proceeding is admissible so long as 
the prosecutor possessed a motivation to extract testimony aimed at the 
defendant‘s guilt or innocence.122  Thus, a broad interpretation of similar 
motive would produce consistent outcomes, and defendants could not 
argue that the court treated them unfairly or that they did not receive a 
fair trial.123 
Moreover, a broad interpretation of similar motive favors the 
accused in criminal cases because defendants can admit former 
testimony without any hassle; consequently, the courts conserve judicial 
resources.124  Courts would not waste judicial resources deliberating on 
whether former testimony is admissible because the courts would apply 
a simple test to determine whether to admit former testimony.125  Liberal 
                                                 
120 See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing appellate court cases using a broad interpretation of 
similar motive and that the inquiry requires the courts to consider if the government‘s 
purpose during both proceedings focused on whether the defendant was guilty or 
innocent). 
121 See supra note 64 (introducing cases using a broad interpretation of similar motive).  
But see supra note 87 (discussing cases using a narrow interpretation of similar motive). 
122 See supra note 6 (explaining the importance of uniformity of the laws and consistent 
application so that people know what to expect). 
123 See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 95–97 (1979) (holding that the court violated the 
defendant‘s right to due process by not admitting the statement of a co-defendant that the 
prosecution wanted to exclude as hearsay); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 
(1973) (holding that the accused in a criminal trial must have the chance to defend and 
present his case, and the right to call witnesses to support his case is essential to due 
process); Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 410–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the 
district court violated the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by 
excluding the transcript of an unavailable witness‘s grand jury testimony). 
124 See supra note 118 (discussing a case illustrating a broad interpretation of similar 
motive and a case illustrating a narrow interpretation). 
125 United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1993).  Judge Pratt argued in his 
dissent that the majority‘s narrow interpretation of similar motive would present a difficult 
challenge for the courts to administer because the judge would have ―to compare the 
‗intensity of the interest‘ that the prosecutor possessed before the grand jury with his 
‗intensity of interest‘ at the trial.‖  Id.  Examining what is going through a prosecutor‘s 
mind during the grand jury proceeding and at trial forces the courts to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to assess the information available to the prosecutor and what the 
prosecutor thought about the information during the grand jury proceeding and at trial.  Id. 
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admission of former testimony would also satisfy the Federal Rules of 
Evidence‘s ―liberal thrust‖ towards admissibility.126  In addition, 
allowing defendants to admit more former testimony would ensure the 
courts do not violate defendants‘ due process rights because the court 
would not prevent the defendants from introducing exculpatory grand 
jury testimony that could reduce their sentences or prove their 
innocence.127 
Introducing exculpatory grand jury testimony to the jury ensures 
that the defendant is provided with the proper chance to present 
evidence before being convicted.128  This is essentially another safeguard 
to prevent the court from wrongfully convicting a defendant.129  If the 
defendant is allowed to present former testimony, he cannot argue that 
the court wrongfully convicted him because he could not present 
exculpatory grand jury testimony.130  A broad interpretation of similar 
motive essentially favors the defendant in a criminal trial while 
providing another safeguard to ensure the defendant receives due 
process and is not wrongfully convicted.131 
A broad interpretation would also allow more evidence to reach the 
jury and would allow the jury to make the final determination on how 
                                                 
126 See Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (stating that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence  contain a ―liberal thrust‖ towards admissibility); see also FED. R. EVID. 
401–403 (defining relevance broadly).  See generally, LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 6 
(discussing the theory that the more evidence admitted, the more likely the goals of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence will be satisfied). 
127 See United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district 
court‘s decision that the prosecutor did not have a similar motive during trial as it did 
during a grand jury proceeding and allowing the defendant to introduce exculpatory grand 
jury testimony); see also supra note 69 (suggesting that courts cannot apply the hearsay rule 
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice and to deprive a defendant of his right to 
present a defense). 
128 See supra notes 84, 85 and accompanying text (discussing that the court held the 
prosecution had a similar motive at trial as it did during the grand jury proceeding so the 
defendant could admit the exculpatory grand jury testimony). 
129 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 917.  The dissent concluded by stating that the majority leaves the 
decision of whether Rule 804(b)(1) applies in the control of the prosecutor, which is ―at 
odds with the main objective of going to trial―permitting the jury, not the prosecutor, to 
determine what is the truth.‖  Id. 
130 See United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (admitting prior 
testimony of an arresting officer from a suppression hearing under 804(b)(1)).  The court 
found that the legal and factual issues in the state and federal suppression hearing showed 
that the defendant had a similar, if not identical motive during the proceedings.  Id. 
131 See United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the 
government has the same motive during trial as it did during the grand jury proceeding; 
therefore, the court allowed the defendant to introduce the former testimony to the jury to 
defend his case); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516–17 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that 
when a prosecutor has a chance to question a witness during a grand jury proceeding, the 
testimony is admissible under Rule 804(b)(1)). 
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much weight to give the former testimony.132  Allowing more evidence 
to reach the jury will protect defendants from abuses of power by the 
government.133  Providing the jury with the opportunity to assess how 
much credibility to give former testimony is more likely to discover the 
truth than a process conducted by the judge.134  The right to a trial by 
jury in criminal cases and being judged by one‘s peers is a fundamental 
part of the American justice system, and the broad interpretation of 
similar motive allows the jury to assess how credible the former 
testimony is.135  Allowing the jury to assess how much weight to give 
former testimony is consistent with one of the purposes of juries—to 
make credibility determinations.136 
In addition to letting the jury assess how much weight to give former 
testimony, a broad interpretation of similar motive favors the defendant 
in a criminal trial by giving the prosecutor less power, because the 
prosecutor cannot refuse to immunize a witness and then exclude his 
exculpatory grand jury testimony as hearsay.137  A broad interpretation 
of similar motive takes the power of controlling whether grand jury 
testimony is admissible away from the prosecutor and puts the 
prosecutor on the same level as the defendant with regards to admitting 
                                                 
132 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983).  A broad approach is consistent with 
the ―fundamental premise of our entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose 
of the jury is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important matters from the 
unimportant matters . . . when called upon to do so.‖  Id. 
133 Massaro, supra note 50, at 512–13.  Being judged by a jury is more likely to serve the 
defendant‘s best interest because the input of all the jurors‘ opinions will reduce the 
chances of short-sighted, unfair, or erroneous decisions.  Id. at 511.  A fact-finding process 
done by multiple people will discover the ―truth‖ before a process that is only conducted 
by one person.  Id.  The jurors inject the community‘s desire and the community‘s 
conscience.  Id. at 512.  The jurors can protect the defendant from abuses of power by the 
judge.  Id. at 511. 
134 Id. at 511–12.  ―If this theoretical underpinning is correct, the jury is especially 
valuable in the criminal case, because decisions about guilt or innocence reflect subjective 
value judgments that have tremendous implications for the accused.‖  Id. 
135 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 
840–41 (Fla. 1984) (suggesting that American society places an extreme importance on the 
right to be judged by peers). 
136 See Chadbourn, supra note 50, at 947 (suggesting that the jury‘s duty is to make 
credibility determinations). 
137 United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 324 (1992).  The defendants in 
Salerno argued that if a witness gives inculpatory grand jury testimony the government 
grants immunity and examines the witness at trial.  Id.  Alternatively, if the witness gives 
exculpatory testimony, the government refuses to grant immunity and argues the 
testimony is hearsay.  Id.  In addition, if the witness testifies without immunity, the 
government has the power to impeach the witness with his grand jury testimony under 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A).  See generally FED. R. EVID. 806 (giving the government the ability to 
impeach a hearsay declarant if hearsay testimony is admitted). 
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former testimony.138  Additionally, using a broad interpretation of 
similar motive will prevent the prosecutor from potentially going on 
arbitrary fishing expeditions during grand jury proceedings because the 
testimony may be used to hurt the prosecutor‘s case during trial if the 
defendant can easily admit the testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).139  
Therefore, the broad interpretation of similar motive takes power away 
from the prosecutor that he can use to the detriment of the defendant.140 
2. Negative Aspects of a Broad Interpretation 
Contrarily, the broad interpretation of similar motive has some 
negative effects because former testimony that is hearsay is easily 
admitted.141  Hearsay testimony is often unreliable because the jury 
cannot observe the witness‘s demeanor and the witness is not present for 
cross-examination.142  One of the goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
is to increase the accuracy and reliability of evidence that is admissible, 
but a broad interpretation of similar motive does not increase the 
reliability of evidence reaching the jury.143  Therefore, if courts admit 
                                                 
138 United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 1992).  Grand jury 
proceedings favor the government because of ―the ex parte nature of the proceeding, the 
leading questions by the government, the absence of the defendant, the tendency of a 
witness to favor the government because of the grant of immunity, [and] the absence of 
confrontation.‖  Id. 
139 See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (discussing that 
prosecutors cannot use grand juries to go on arbitrary fishing expeditions); see also, e.g., In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 
1985) (holding that using a grand jury to prepare a pending indictment for trial is not 
acceptable). 
140 See, e.g., United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing the 
judge to determine whether the government possessed a similar motive during the grand 
jury proceeding as it did at trial); see also supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text 
(discussing the factors the judge assessed to determine whether the prosecutor had a 
similar motive). 
141 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916.  Several judges believe grand jury testimony is not reliable; see 
also, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that evidence 
given before a grand jury does not help the evidence‘s reliability); United States v. West, 
574 F.2d 1131, 1138–39 (4th Cir. 1978) (Widener, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
overestimated the reliability of grand jury testimony). 
142 See Mercier, supra note 61, at 341 (suggesting that a narrow interpretation of similar 
motive could potentially violate the right to effectively examine a witness). 
143 Weissenberger, supra note 63, at 309 (discussing the trend towards an emphasis on 
trustworthiness as the goal of evidentiary rules).  Compare United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 
951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (using a broad interpretation and allowing the defendant to admit 
former testimony by simply determining whether the prosecutor sought to extract 
incriminating testimony against the defendant during both proceedings), with United 
States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523–24 (1st Cir. 1997) (examining the prosecutor‘s motive in-
depth and finding that the prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding was not 
the same as it would be at trial). 
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former testimony easily, there is a risk that inaccurate former testimony 
will reach the jury and wrongly persuade the jurors.144 
Furthermore, the prosecution often has different motives during a 
grand jury proceeding than at trial.145  If exculpatory grand jury 
testimony is easily admitted against the government, the prosecutor will 
have to change his strategy for examining witnesses during grand jury 
proceedings.146  This may not be fair to the prosecution because the 
prosecutor may not want to disclose information about an ongoing 
investigation.147  Also, the prosecutor does not have any incentive to 
heavily cross-examine a perjurious witness because the prosecutor can 
charge the witness for perjury or call upon the witness later.148  Thus, a 
broad interpretation of similar motive does not favor the government 
because the prosecutor may not have any incentive to develop a 
witness‘s testimony during a grand jury proceeding, and a broad 
interpretation of similar motive would not take that into account.149 
Easily admitting former testimony will not give the prosecutor any 
incentive to examine a witness during a grand jury proceeding if he 
knows the testimony will be admissible at trial.150  This may have a 
                                                 
144 See supra notes 35–38 (addressing the dangers of admitting hearsay and allowing the 
jury to hear evidence that may not be reliable); see also Mercier, supra note 61, at 341 (noting 
that a broad interpretation of similar motive could pose a problem by preventing a party 
from using the right to effectively examine a witness). 
145 See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523 (discussing that the government does not have the same 
motive to discredit and question a witness during a grand jury proceeding as it does 
during trial); DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 913 (discussing that the government often treats a witness 
differently during a grand jury proceeding because the prosecutor does not want to 
disclose information about an ongoing investigation or the identity of informants). 
146 United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 237–38 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that a 
prosecutor may not seek to discredit a grand jury witness and that the issues before the 
grand jury will not necessarily be the same as those at trial).  If the court consistently 
admits former testimony by adopting a broad interpretation, the prosecutor‘s strategy may 
change and he may examine the witness differently.  Id. 
147 See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911 (averring that the prosecutor did not want to disclose the 
identity of witnesses cooperating with the government‘s investigation or wiretapped 
conversations that did not corroborate the witness‘s testimony). 
148 Salerno IV, 974 F.2d at 237 (explaining that the prosecutor can excuse a perjurious 
witness and continue the grand jury investigation, while retaining the option of going after 
the witness later for perjury, or recall the witness later when the investigation produces 
more evidence with which to confront the witness). 
149 Compare United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443–44 (5th Cir. 2004) (examining only 
whether the defendant‘s motive at the grand jury hearing and at trial was to discredit a 
witness and holding that former testimony was admissible), with State v. Farquharson, 731 
N.W.2d 797, 803 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (using the factors listed in DiNapoli to determine 
whether a similar motive is present). 
150 DePalma, supra note 63, at 574.  The prosecutor typically does not want to confront 
witnesses during grand jury proceedings with evidence that will reveal confidential 
sources or information about an ongoing investigation.  Id. 
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chilling effect on the prosecutor during grand jury proceedings and 
make him change his strategy when examining a witness, which could 
have a negative effect on the government‘s investigatory ability.151  The 
public and the government have a strong interest in punishing criminals 
and getting to the bottom of legal disputes, but using a broad 
interpretation of similar motive may cause the prosecutor to be cautious 
when he questions a witness during a grand jury proceeding because the 
testimony may resurface and hurt his case at trial.152  A broad 
interpretation of similar motive may require the prosecutor to alter his 
strategy during the grand jury proceedings and may make the 
prosecutor‘s job of prosecuting criminals more difficult.153  As a result of 
the burden placed on the prosecutor by using a broad interpretation of 
similar motive, some courts favor using a narrow interpretation.154 
B. Narrow Interpretation of “Similar Motive” 
Rather than using a broad interpretation of similar motive, some 
courts use a narrow interpretation of similar motive to determine 
whether the prosecutor‘s motive during a grand jury proceeding is the 
same as it would be at trial.155  Like the broad interpretation of similar 
motive, the narrow interpretation has both positive and negative aspects 
                                                 
151 Id.  Grand jury proceedings are non-adversarial in nature, and there is a lack of a 
competitive climate because the defendant and the defense counsel are not present.  Id.  
The prosecutor only needs to establish probable cause, whereas during the trial the burden 
of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  If former testimony is easily admitted against 
the government, the prosecutor may hesitate to question witnesses or change strategy.  
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915. 
152 United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997).  A broad interpretation of 
similar motive does not take into account factors such as the different burdens of proof, the 
evidence available to the prosecutor, desire to maintain confidentiality of information 
pertaining to an ongoing investigation, lack of evidence, and the non-adversarial context of 
the grand jury proceeding.  See id. (finding grand jury testimony admissible because the 
prosecutor had the same motive to develop a witness‘s testimony during both the grand 
jury hearing and at trial). 
153 See id. (adopting a broad interpretation of similar motive and stating that the witness‘s 
testimony could have had an impact on the verdict).  A narrow interpretation of similar 
motive provides more protection to the prosecution from having former testimony 
admitted against it during trial.  United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 379–80 (D.C. Cir. 
2006).  A broad interpretation only considers whether the prosecutor attempted to extract 
incriminating testimony, which allows the defendant to introduce exculpatory grand jury 
testimony more easily.  United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2009). 
154 See supra Part II.B.2.b (summarizing the narrow interpretation of similar motive). 
155 See supra note 70 (suggesting that the district courts should use a fact specific inquiry 
to determine whether the government possessed a similar motive). 
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to it.156  The next sections discuss the positive and negative effects of a 
narrow interpretation.157 
1. Positive Aspects of a Narrow Interpretation 
The narrow interpretation of similar motive provides the greatest 
benefit to the prosecutor because defendants have a difficult time 
admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony under a narrow 
interpretation.158  The narrow interpretation favors the prosecutor by 
increasing the chances that the prosecutor will successfully argue that 
the court should exclude former testimony as hearsay because the 
prosecution did not have a similar motive during the grand jury 
proceeding as it would at trial.159  The narrow interpretation of similar 
motive recognizes the fact that prosecutors may not fully examine an 
exonerating grand jury witness because the prosecutor does not want to 
give up vital information about an ongoing investigation.160  Keeping 
information about ongoing investigations confidential is also in the 
public‘s interest because society does not want prosecutors giving up 
vital information in court that could inhibit law enforcement 
investigations and make it harder to catch criminals.161 
                                                 
156 See infra Part III.B.2 (showing some of the problems that arise when courts use a 
narrow interpretation of similar motive to assess similar motive). 
157 See infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 (discussing the positive effects of a narrow 
interpretation, followed by the negative effects). 
158 See Carson, 455 F.3d at 379–80 (suggesting that courts should use a fact specific inquiry 
to determine similar motive).  Narrow interpretations require the court to look at factors, 
such as whether the party possessed a substantially similar motive, what is at stake, the 
burden of proof, and what lines of questioning occurred during the prior cross-
examination before the court admits former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).  United States 
v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993). 
159 See Weissenberger, supra note 63, at 298.  The narrow interpretation is more cautious 
and takes into account tactical considerations of attorneys representing their clients‘ 
interests.  Id.  Attorneys may use different strategies during the two proceedings, even 
though the issue may be the same.  Id. 
160 Weissenberger, Transcripts, supra note 64, at 344 (discussing the intended use of Rule 
804(b)(1)).  The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, who created changes 
to Rule 804(b)(1), did not think it was fair to admit former testimony when a party‘s 
interests were not properly represented in the prior proceeding.  Id.  Therefore, one can 
argue that the Judiciary Committee intended for the prosecutor‘s interests to be taken into 
account before admitted former testimony from a grand jury proceeding.  Id. at 34446. 
161 United States v. Salerno (Salerno II), 952 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1991).  The government 
will hesitate to cross-examine witnesses because there is a chance the cross-examination 
will reveal the identity and existence of confidential sources.  Id.  See generally BRENNER & 
LOCKHART, supra note 62, at 186–233 (stressing the importance of maintaining the secrecy of 
grand jury proceedings); FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 62, at 23–24 (arguing that the 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings is a good idea).  The most important reasons for 
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings are 
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Additionally, in a grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor‘s only goal 
is to secure an indictment, and the burden of proof that must be met to 
secure an indictment during the grand jury proceeding is only probable 
cause.162  When the prosecutor believes the probable cause burden is 
met, he does not have any reason to continue examining exonerating 
witnesses because he believes the grand jury will likely indict.163  During 
grand jury proceedings, the prosecution may not possess the best 
evidence to impeach a witness that is lying, and the government may not 
even know the witness is lying until later.164  The prosecutor does not 
have any incentive to strongly cross-examine a witness because if the 
witness is lying the prosecutor can bring a perjury charge against the 
witness later.165  The narrow interpretation favors the government by 
protecting the prosecutor from these potential problems and does not 
make the prosecutor treat exonerating witnesses as trial witnesses.166 
                                                                                                             
(1) [t]o prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be 
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its 
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their 
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation 
of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before 
[the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) 
to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have 
information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect 
[the] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact 
that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing 
trial where there was no probability of guilt. 
Id. (first alteration added). 
162 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (suggesting that the government does not 
treat a witness the same during a grand jury proceeding as it would at trial). 
163 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912–13 (arguing that the prosecutor does not have as much at stake 
during a grand jury proceeding as he does at trial) 
164 See Salerno II, 952 F.2d at 626 (discussing why a prosecutor may have a different 
motive during a grand jury proceeding than he would at trial). 
165 See United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that 
the prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding is not the same as it is during 
trial).  Prosecutors cannot confront a witness suspected of perjury with all the evidence it 
has, otherwise the prosecutor would risk exposing an ongoing investigation, the identity of 
informants, and evidence revealing the nature of investigation techniques being used.  Id.  
The prosecutor does not have any motive to discredit the witness during the grand jury 
proceeding because the prosecutor can simply pursue a perjury charge later or examine the 
witness again when more evidence is available.  Id.  Moreover, discrediting a grand jury 
witness is usually unnecessary because of the lower burden of proof and the government‘s 
ability to call its own witness and additional witnesses at its leisure.  United States v. Omar, 
104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997). 
166 See generally Zenith Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980) (taking into account factors such as the type of prior proceeding, trial strategy, 
number of parties and issues, and the possible penalties or financial stakes to determine 
whether there is a similar motive).  Assessing multiple factors ensures the party whom 
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The narrow interpretation also fulfills one of the goals of the hearsay 
rule by increasing the reliability and accuracy of evidence presented to 
the jury.167  Hearsay is often unreliable because the jury cannot observe 
the witness‘s demeanor, and by using the narrow interpretation the 
likelihood that potentially unreliable hearsay will reach the jury 
decreases.168  If courts easily admit former testimony, there is a risk that 
inaccurate former testimony will reach the jury and wrongly persuade 
the jurors.169  Therefore, the narrow interpretation of similar motive 
helps prevent hearsay from reaching the jury.170 
2. Negative Aspects of a Narrow Interpretation 
Alternatively, the narrow interpretation also has some negative 
effects because the courts have to weigh many different factors to 
determine if there is a similar motive.171  Under the narrow 
interpretation, the courts must assess broad factors, such as ―whether the 
party resisting the offered testimony at a pending proceeding had at a 
prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or 
disprove) the same side of a substantially similar issue.‖172  Courts also 
should examine what is at stake, the burden of proof, and look at the 
prior examination to see what line of questioning was available to the 
prosecutor but not developed.173  It is difficult to ascertain the 
                                                                                                             
former testimony is admitted against had a prior opportunity to develop the unavailable 
witness‘s testimony.  Id. 
167 See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (addressing the multiple ways in which 
the hearsay rule increases the reliability of evidence that reaches the jury). 
168 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (addressing the benefits of cross-
examination and the benefits of allowing the jury to observe a witness subject to cross-
examination). 
169 See supra notes 49–50 (discussing how attempting to admit former testimony presents 
a hearsay problem for courts); see also Mercier, supra note 61, at 341 (arguing that a narrow 
interpretation of similar motive would make it easier to argue that a party‘s motive at trial 
is not similar to what it was during the grand jury proceeding). 
170 Compare United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (using a broad 
interpretation of similar motive and allowing the defendant to introduce exculpatory grand 
jury testimony), with Omar, 104 F.3d at 521–24 (adopting a narrow interpretation of similar 
motive because during the grand jury proceeding the government likely wanted to protect 
the confidentiality of witnesses or go after the witness later for perjury). 
171 See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (providing examples of factors courts 
should use to determine whether a similar motive is present). 
172 United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993); see supra notes 95–97 and 
accompanying text (listing the factors the court used). 
173 See supra note 96 (stating that the factors are all relevant to whether a similar motive is 
present, but the factors are not conclusive). 
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prosecutor‘s tactical considerations and maneuvers, and examining these 
broad factors will be difficult and costly for the courts.174 
The narrow interpretation of similar motive does not favor the 
defendant in a criminal trial because the narrow interpretation can lead 
to potential violations of a defendant‘s due process rights by excluding 
exculpatory grand jury testimony.175  Preventing a defendant from 
admitting former testimony does not adequately ensure that the courts 
will not violate the defendant‘s due process rights because the court is 
more likely to exclude valuable evidence that could potentially violate 
the defendant‘s right to present a defense.176  Accordingly, using a 
narrow interpretation of similar motive may lead to violations of due 
process rights because the defendant will not likely be able to present 
evidence that could exonerate him or lessen his sentence.177 
Not letting defendants introduce exculpatory grand jury testimony 
by using a narrow interpretation of similar motive goes against the 
Federal Rules of Evidence‘s ―liberal thrust‖ towards admissibility 
because the court will likely exclude former testimony.178  The narrow 
interpretation prevents more evidence from reaching the jury and leaves 
the determination of admissibility up to the judge.179  Moreover, the 
                                                 
174 DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916.  See supra note 99 (quoting the DiNapoli dissent‘s argument that 
the administration of the majority‘s test could prove to be difficult). 
175 See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that the lower court violated 
the defendant‘s right to due process by excluding the statement of a co-defendant as 
hearsay); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 302 (1973) (holding that a defendant in 
a criminal trial has a right to defend and present his case, and ―the hearsay rule may not be 
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice‖); Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 
400, 411–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to 
present a defense required the court to admit a transcript of an unavailable witness‘s grand 
jury testimony).  Offering testimony to support one‘s case is a right that is essential to 
receiving a fair trial.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972); Jenkins v. 
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428–29 (1969); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). 
176 United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523–24 (1st Cir. 1997) (using a narrow 
interpretation of similar motive); see also supra note 69 (discussing situations where the 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense requires the admission of 
evidence that the court would normally exclude). 
177 See supra note 175 (discussing how courts cannot apply the hearsay rule 
mechanistically to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence in his defense). 
178 See LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 6 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence favor admissibility and admitting more evidence is more likely to satisfy the 
goals of the rules); see also FED. R. EVID. 401–403 (giving a broad definition of what evidence 
is relevant); Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (arguing that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence favor admissibility and have a ―liberal thrust‖ towards 
admissibility). 
179 See supra Part II.B.2.b (providing illustrations of cases using the narrow interpretation 
to exclude exculpatory grand jury testimony); see also supra note 51 (discussing the 
importance of being judged by a jury of one‘s peers and letting the jury decide how much 
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narrow interpretation favors the prosecutor in a criminal trial by 
essentially allowing the prosecutor to decide whether former testimony 
is admissible because if a witness offers incriminating evidence against a 
defendant, the government may grant the witness immunity and allow 
him to testify at trial.180  Conversely, if the testimony is exculpatory, the 
government attempts to exclude the testimony as hearsay.181  This allows 
the prosecutor to essentially control whether former testimony is 
admissible, which goes against the main objective of going to trial—
allowing the jury, not the prosecutor, to decide what the truth is.182 
Preventing a defendant from admitting former testimony may not 
ensure that the defendant is provided with the proper chance to present 
evidence before being convicted.183  Thus, a narrow interpretation of 
similar motive does not favor the defendant in a criminal trial because it 
takes away a potential safeguard to ensure that the defendant receives 
due process and is allowed to properly defend his case.184 
C. Judith M. Mercier’s Suggested Change to Rule 804(b)(1) 
A possible revision to Rule 804(b)(1) that Judith M. Mercier 
suggested is to add a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard.185  The reasonable 
                                                                                                             
weight to give evidence in order to protect the defendant from corruption, overzealous 
prosecutors, and biased judges). 
180 United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 324 (1992).  The prosecutor can 
grant a witness use immunity if he offers incriminating evidence; however, the prosecutor 
can also refuse to grant immunity and attempt to exclude the testimony as hearsay if the 
witness gives exonerating testimony.  Id.; see also supra note 99 (stating that the dissent in 
United States v. DiNapoli thought a narrow interpretation of similar motive rewrote Rule 
804(b)(1) by changing similar motive to same motive and that the majority‘s approach 
essentially allows the prosecutor to decide whether the court will admit former testimony, 
which prevents the jury from determining the truth). 
181 See supra note 137 (describing how the prosecutor uses immunity to the disadvantage 
of the defendant). 
182 See supra notes 50–51, 133 (discussing the importance of the jury and the defendant‘s 
right to be judged by his peers); see also supra notes 22, 50 (suggesting that the Federal Rules 
of Evidence favor admissibility and letting the jury assess what is true). 
183 See supra note 69 (providing cases that show courts cannot apply the hearsay rule 
mechanistically to prevent the defendant from offering testimony to prove his innocence 
because being able to offer testimony is a right that is essential to receiving a fair trial). 
184 See supra note 51 (discussing the importance of allowing the jury to decide issues in 
order to protect the defendant from overzealous prosecutors and potentially biased 
judges); see also supra note 133 (arguing that a fact-finding process conducted by multiple 
people is more likely to discover the truth than a process conducted by only one person). 
185 See Mercier, supra note 61, at 337–42 (proposing that the courts should modify Rule 
804(b)(1) by adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard to conserve adversarial fairness).  
Judith M. Mercier is a practicing attorney at Holland & Knight in Florida.  She received her 
J.D. from the University of Miami School of Law and has a B.S. in accounting from the 
University of Florida. 
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examiner standard ensures that the party against whom the testimony is 
offered possessed a similar motive to cross-examine the witness by 
requiring a subjective analysis to determine whether a reasonable 
examiner would have a similar motive to develop the witness‘s 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.186  Like the broad and 
narrow interpretation of similar motive, adding reasonable examiner 
standard to Rule 804(b)(1) has both negative and positive effects on the 
judicial process.187 
1. Positive Aspects of Adding a ―Reasonable Examiner‖ Standard 
One of the benefits to adding a reasonable examiner standard is that 
the American judicial system is an adversarial system, and adding a 
reasonable examiner standard to Rule 804(b)(1) further supports the 
adversarial system.188  The reasonable examiner standard basically asks 
whether a reasonable examiner in the situation would possess a similar 
motive to develop the witness‘s testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination to advocate for his client.189  By assessing what a reasonable 
examiner would do, the reasonable examiner standard focuses on the 
circumstances in the case and ensures that the party possessed a similar 
motive and adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness.190  The 
reasonable examiner standard does not prevent former testimony from 
being admitted when a litigant previously decided not to vigorously 
examine a witness.191 
2. Negative Aspects of a ―Reasonable Examiner‖ Standard 
In contrast, the reasonable examiner standard makes the similar 
motive determination more difficult for courts by adding another 
                                                 
186 See id. at 342 (concluding that courts might hesitate to adopt the reasonable examiner 
standard because it requires a subjective analysis). 
187 See infra Part III.C.1 and Part III.C.2 (discussing the positive and negative effects of 
adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard to Rule 804(b)(1)). 
188 See Mercier, supra note 61, at 338 (proposing that the reasonable examiner standard 
focuses on the circumstances in each case to ensure that courts do not admit former 
testimony against a party that did not have a similar motive or a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination). 
189 See id. at 338–42 (providing a discussion of the reasonable examiner standard and 
illustrating how courts can use the standard to decide whether to admit former testimony 
under Rule 804(b)(1) to promote fairness). 
190 Id. 
191 United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992); see also supra note 
54 (proposing that Rule 804(b)(1) only requires that the party possess a valid opportunity 
for cross-examination and whether the party took advantage of the opportunity is 
irrelevant). 
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element to consider when deciding whether former testimony is 
admissible under Rule 804(b)(1).192  Not all lawyers think the same; 
therefore, some lawyers may make different choices or tactical decisions 
in certain situations.193  This type of situation could make it difficult for 
courts to assess what a reasonable examiner would do under the 
circumstances.194  Adding a reasonable examiner standard essentially 
adds another vague term to Rule 804(b)(1).195  The reasonable examiner 
standard removes counsel‘s role as strategic decision-maker and forces 
courts to play lawyer;  this does not help to determine when a similar 
motive is present but further confuses the rule.196 
In summary, there are positive and negative consequences to each 
interpretation, and there is no simple solution.197  Courts need to reach a 
compromise between the different approaches in order to balance the 
competing interests of the prosecutor and the defendant and to promote 
fairness and consistency.198 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Courts will continuously fail to promote fairness and consistency by 
using either a broad or narrow interpretation of similar motive.199  A 
defendant‘s ability to introduce exculpatory grand jury testimony during 
a trial currently depends entirely on the circuit in which the case is 
                                                 
192 See Mercier, supra note 61, at 342 (stating that the reasonable examiner standard fits 
within the vague meaning of Rule 804(b)(1)). 
193 See supra note 99 (discussing that courts cannot easily determine what a lawyer is 
thinking or the strategies the lawyer employed and attempting to do so would require 
courts to conduct a burdensome evidentiary hearing). 
194 See supra note 125 (discussing that examining what is going through a prosecutor‘s 
mind during the grand jury proceeding and at trial forces the courts to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to assess the information available to the prosecutor, in addition to 
what the prosecutor thought about the information during the grand jury proceeding and 
at trial; therefore, figuring out the prosecutor‘s tactical decisions and thoughts will not be 
easy for courts to assess). 
195 See Mercier, supra note 61, at 342 (stating that the ―reasonable examiner‖ standard fits 
well with the nebulous meaning of opportunity and similar motive). 
196 See supra note 125 (arguing that courts will have a hard time determining whether the 
prosecutor possessed a similar motive because it is not easy to determine what is going 
through the prosecutor‘s mind during a grand jury proceeding and at trial). 
197 See supra Part III.A, III.B, and III.C (analyzing the positive and negative effects of the 
different approaches courts use to determine whether a criminal defendant can admit 
exculpatory grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)). 
198 See infra Part IV (suggesting that courts should conduct a factual inquiry to determine 
whether the government possesses a similar motive); see also supra note 8 (noting that the 
purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to promote fairness and consistency regarding 
evidence admitted during trials). 
199 See supra Part III.A and Part III.B (analyzing the broad and narrow interpretations of 
similar motive and how courts use the different interpretations). 
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tried.200  For example, if the defendant‘s trial is in the Sixth Circuit, the 
court will most likely allow the defendant to introduce exculpatory 
grand jury testimony under a broad interpretation of similar motive.201  
In contrast, if the defendant‘s trial is in the Second Circuit, the court will 
likely prohibit the defendant from admitting exculpatory grand jury 
testimony under a narrow interpretation of similar motive.202 
The discord and inconsistency resulting from these two 
interpretations of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive element is exactly what 
the Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to avoid.203  Rule 102 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence states that one of the goals of evidence law is 
to secure fairness and prevent unjustifiable expense and delay.204  In 
order to promote fairness and consistency, courts should do away with 
the broad and narrow interpretations, and instead courts should conduct 
a factual inquiry by examining (1) what is at stake and the burden of 
proof; (2) the government‘s interest; (3) the previous cross-examination; 
and (4) the defendant‘s interest. 
A. What is at Stake and the Burden of Proof 
The first factor courts should examine is what is at stake and the 
burden of proof.  This requires the court to take into account that during 
a grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor only needs to establish probable 
cause to secure an indictment, but during a criminal trial, the burden of 
proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.205  Because of the difference in the 
burden of proof, the prosecutor may not have the same motive during a 
grand jury proceeding as he would at trial.  On the other hand, the 
defendant‘s freedom is at stake in a criminal case, and the defendant 
may face a substantial amount of time in prison.  Therefore, the use of 
exculpatory grand jury testimony is likely very important for the 
defendant.206 
                                                 
200 See supra Part II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b (discussing how circuit courts use a broad and 
narrow interpretation of similar motive to determine whether to admit exculpatory grand 
jury testimony). 
201 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text (summarizing the Sixth Circuit‘s 
decision to adopt a broad interpretation of similar motive in United States v. Foster). 
202 See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text (summarizing the Second Circuit‘s 
decision to adopt a narrow interpretation of similar motive in United States v. DiNapoli). 
203 See supra note 8 (stating that courts must use the Federal Rules of Evidence to secure 
fairness and to reach just results). 
204 See supra note 25 (giving the text of Rule 102 and the purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
205 See supra note 105 (addressing the differences in the burden of proof during a grand 
jury proceeding and during a criminal trial). 
206 See supra notes 69, 175 (listing cases where courts state that giving the defendant the 
opportunity to offer testimony in his defense is essential to a fair trial). 
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B. Government’s Interest 
The court must also consider the government‘s interest in protecting 
witnesses and preserving the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.  
This also includes the fact that discrediting a grand jury witness is rarely 
important because the prosecutor can always charge a witness later for 
perjury.  Courts should also consider the evidence available to the 
prosecutor because more evidence may become available later, and the 
courts do not want to have a chilling effect on prosecutors during grand 
jury proceedings by easily admitting all exculpatory grand jury 
testimony. 
C. Previous Cross-Examination 
Next, the courts should consider the previous cross-examination, 
focusing on the lines of questioning the prosecutor used and what lines 
of questioning were available to the prosecutor but not pursued.207  
Prosecutors can always argue they did not pursue certain lines of 
questioning during grand jury proceedings, and the courts should take 
that into consideration; however, the lines of questioning the prosecutor 
did not pursue are only one factor to consider.  This factor will give the 
court a better idea of whether the prosecutor purposely avoided asking 
certain questions in order to protect the identity of witnesses or the 
confidentiality of ongoing investigations. 
D. Defendant’s Interest 
Last, courts should assess the defendant‘s interest in presenting 
evidence to defend his case and protecting his constitutional right to 
present a defense.208  The defendant in a criminal case may lose his 
freedom if he is convicted; therefore, the courts should ensure that the 
defendant has the opportunity to present evidence to support his case.209  
The Federal Rules of Evidence have a liberal thrust towards 
admissibility, and the jury traditionally assesses the truthfulness of 
                                                 
207 See supra note 96 (discussing how the court should examine the lines of questioning 
the prosecutor used or avoided during the grand jury proceeding). 
208 See supra notes 69, 175 (discussing the importance of preserving the defendants right 
to present a defense to exonerate himself). 
209 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).  In order for a defendant to receive a 
fair trial, the defendant must have the opportunity to examine witnesses and offer 
testimony.  See, e,g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 411, 428–29 (1969); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 
U.S. 257, 273 (1948).  Courts should not apply the hearsay rule or the former testimony 
exception mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 30203. 
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facts.210  Thus, courts should generally favor allowing defendants to 
present exculpatory grand jury testimony so the jury may determine 
how much weight to give the testimony and whether the testimony is 
credible. 
In brief, all of these factors are relevant to whether a prosecutor has a 
similar motive during a grand jury proceeding and at trial, but none of 
the factors alone are conclusive.  The courts should assess these factors 
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the government possessed 
a similar motive.  If the federal courts adopt these factors, decisions will 
be more consistent. 
In addition to examining these factors, courts should place the 
burden on the government to justify exclusion of grand jury testimony.  
Courts should favor admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony in 
order to let the jury decide how much weight to give the testimony.  
Similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 403, the similar motive 
element of Rule 804(b)(1) should favor admissibility and a finding of 
similar motive.211  Courts do not want to prevent prosecutors from using 
grand juries or hesitating to question witnesses during grand jury 
proceedings, but protecting the constitutional rights of the defendants 
and preserving their ability to present a defense warrants the extra 
burden that the prosecutor may face.212  Therefore, an interpretation of 
similar motive that favors admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony 
satisfies the plain meaning rule and is more likely to satisfy the goals of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence without producing an unconstitutional 
result.213 
Citizens lose faith in the justice system when courts apply laws and 
rules inconsistently.  The public, prosecutors, and defendants all expect 
laws to apply consistently regardless of the circuit trying the case.  When 
                                                 
210 See supra notes 51, 178 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally favor 
admitting evidence and that the American society thinks allowing the jury to determine the 
truth is very important in order to protect defendants from potentially overzealous 
prosecutors and biased judges). 
211 See supra notes 22, 126 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of Evidence favor 
admissibility and that the Federal Rules suggest that a broad interpretation of relevant 
evidence is best because more evidence is admitted under a broad interpretation). 
212 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text (suggesting that prosecutors will not 
ask witnesses certain questions during grand jury proceedings if the prosecutor knows the 
testimony is admissible at trial); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 30203 
(1973) (holding that courts cannot use the hearsay rule to defeat the ends of justice and that 
sometimes a defendant‘s constitutional rights warrant admitting hearsay testimony). 
213 See supra note 48 (addressing the plain meaning rule and how courts can use the rule 
to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence, while also explaining that how the dictionary 
defines the term similar as having characteristics in common, but similar does not mean 
identical). 
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courts apply laws consistently, the public knows what to expect and no 
one can argue the court treated them unfairly or that the court prevented 
them from defending and presenting their case.214  Until there is a 
consistent interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive element, the 
public, prosecutors, and defendants will continue to guess whether the 
court will use a narrow or broad interpretation of similar motive and 
courts will continuously waste resources litigating which approach to 
use. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court on how to interpret 
Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive element, the split amongst the circuit 
courts will likely continue to worsen.  Completely excluding or routinely 
admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony does not serve the interests 
of the justice system or the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The fairest 
approach between the two extremes is for the courts to assess factors on 
a case-by-case basis to determine whether the government possessed a 
similar motive and to provide predictability. 
Currently, John and his attorney await the Seventh Circuit‘s decision 
on whether the exculpatory grand jury testimony is admissible.  John 
appears extremely nervous and his heart is racing because he 
understands the ramifications the court‘s decision will have on his life.  If 
courts stopped relying on a broad or narrow interpretation of similar 
motive, John‘s nervousness and worries would disappear because the 
court would analyze:  (1) what is at stake and the burden of proof, (2) the 
government‘s interest, (3) the previous cross-examination; and (4) the 
defendant‘s interest to determine whether to admit the exculpatory 
grand jury testimony. 
By analyzing these factors, courts will become more consistent at 
determining whether there is a similar motive, while also protecting the 
interests of the defendant and the prosecutor.  Further, the prosecution 
will no longer have the ability to control whether exculpatory grand jury 
testimony is admissible because the prosecutor cannot grant immunity 
and then attempt to exclude the testimony as hearsay.  If the Seventh 
Circuit adopted these factors, the court would ensure that John‘s 
constitutional right to present evidence in his defense is protected, while
                                                 
214 See supra Part II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b (discussing how circuit courts use a broad and 
narrow interpretation of similar motive to determine whether to admit exculpatory grand 
jury testimony and the cases supporting each interpretation). 
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also protecting the prosecutor‘s interest in prosecuting criminals and 
preventing the disclosure of information about ongoing investigations. 
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